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Romanian<br />
President Klaus<br />
Iohannis.<br />
things appear to have gotten out of<br />
control in East Ukraine.<br />
Prior to the deterioration of bilateral<br />
relations, Russia participated in the<br />
structured security dialogue with<br />
the EU as long as the cost-benefit<br />
ratio was in its favour. But the EU’s<br />
increasing focus on ensuring alternative<br />
energy supply routes has<br />
THE INCREASING MILITARISATION OF RUSSIA’S<br />
FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED BY THE<br />
KREMLIN’S APPROACH TO THE REGIME CHANGE IN<br />
KIEV AND THE SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.<br />
fuelled Russia’s geopolitical frustrations<br />
and security fears. Additional<br />
factors in this respect include: attempts<br />
by some European states to<br />
replicate the shale gas “revolution”<br />
(with the participation of American<br />
corporations); the offshore hydrocarbon<br />
potential in the Black Sea<br />
and the Eastern Mediterranean; the<br />
acceleration of grid interconnectivity<br />
at EU level; and the orientation of<br />
policies ensuing from Third Energy<br />
Package (market transparency, competitiveness<br />
and liberalization, with<br />
direct impact on Gazprom’s business<br />
model).<br />
The pressure on gas prices, due to<br />
the shale revolution in the US, together<br />
with a slow-down in energy<br />
consumption in Europe and the<br />
impact of the EU’s liberalisation<br />
policies led to Russia’s acceptance<br />
of new contractual terms, which so<br />
far had been rigid and favourable<br />
to Gazprom. This provided the major<br />
West European consumers more<br />
flexible terms, and price discounts.<br />
At the same time, Russia’s social and<br />
economic challenges (GDP decrease,<br />
demographic decline, slowdown of<br />
price growth for raw materials, corruption<br />
and costs of political and<br />
military reassertion) have resulted<br />
in gradual changes to the energy security<br />
regime in Russia, and a shift in<br />
its relationship with the EU.<br />
Over the time, the Russian geopolitical<br />
game has resulted in on one<br />
hand an asymmetric energy interdependence<br />
between Russia and<br />
the EU’s eastern flank, and on the<br />
other, a symmetric interdependence<br />
with Western Europe (with a<br />
higher degree of vulnerability for<br />
71<br />
CASPIAN REPORT, FALL <strong>2014</strong>