Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

tive energy sources, as a threat to
its strategic interests. The Kremlin’s
desire to maintain its political influence
over the post-Soviet countries
may well be rooted in sentiment,
though it would be naïve though
to believe that Moscow’s economic
interests are not the major motivation.
The Eurasian Union initiative,
President Putin’s major current project,
which envisions a trade bloc
between the post-Soviet countries,
only strengthens this notion. 32 In
this context, economic and political
engagement by Western players in
the post-Soviet space means further
alienation from Russia and more
political and economic independence
for those countries. Alternative
energy routes not only pose a threat
to Russia’s economic interests as
major supplier of the Union, but also
create conditions for intensified engagement
by Western countries in
South Caucasus, a part of the world
that Putin believes to be the sphere
of Russian influence. 33 Moreover, it
also underpins relations with Turkey
34 – another ambitious regional
power with good relations with
Georgia and Azerbaijan. More precisely,
even though the Southern Gas
Corridor does not jeopardise Russia’s
position as the main supplier
in Central and Southeast Europe in
its initial stages, given its long-term
capabilities and its potential impact
on regional orientation toward the
West, the Kremlin’s actual perception
may be very different. 35 The fact
that Moscow is not ignoring such
“threats” became more than obvious
in August 2008, where Russia took
military action, to many, against
NATO’s enlargement and Georgia’s
European and Euro Atlantic Integration.
36 As the most recent example of
Moscow flexing its political and military
muscle against the European
integration of Russia’s neighbouring
countries is seen in the Ukrainian
crisis and the subsequent annexa-
65
32.
See also Andrey Gurkov, “Eurasian Union: Putin’s Answer to the EU”, May 2014, http://www.
dw.de/eurasian-union-putins-answer-to-the-eu/a-17669138
33.
Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia claims its Sphere of Influence”, NYT, August 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/09/01/world/europe/01russia.html_r=0
34.
Tracy C. German, “Corridor of Power: The Caucasus and Energy Security, Caucasian Review of
International Affairs, Spring 2008, Vol.2 (2), p.70
35.
German describes: “some Russian observers (citing Zhil’tsov et al) have described the issue of
pipelines in the Caspian region as a “battle for domination”, particularly the US, which is seeking
to accelerate economic isolation of former Soviet republics from Russia…the battle between
Russia on the one hand and Turkey, Azerbaijan and the US on the other, over the transport of oil
from the Caspian region is not just about securing transit revenues, it is predominately about
securing geopolitical influence in the region” further stating that the analysis would highlight
“the suspicion with which Moscow regards growing western influence in the Caucasus and
Caspian region. Tracy C. German, “Corridor of Power: The Caucasus and Energy Security,
Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Spring 2008, Vol.2 (2), p.70
CASPIAN REPORT, FALL 2014
36.
George Friedman describes NATO’s enlargement concept by the US and EU as a move that
Moscow understands as their strategy to “encircle and break Russia”, especially while trying to
include in this concept Georgia and Ukraine, further arguing that Russia’s invasion in Georgia
in 2008 was nothing but an attempt to “reestablish the Russian sphere of Influence in the
Former Soviet Union region”, implying that Moscow’s goal was to keep the west out of its
own “Sphere of Influence”, George Friedman, “The Russo – Georgian War and the Balance
of Power, STRATFOR, August 2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_
war_and_balance_power#axzz35lmn7LGM. This Notion is further strengthened by the
statement of the then Russian President, Dimitry Medvedev that by invading Georgia Russia
had halted NATO’s eastward expansion (http://en.ria.ru/russia/20111121/168901195.html).
Peter Beaumont, “Russia makes latest high-risk move to keep pieces of its “near abroad”
in check, The Observer, March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/
russia-moves-keep-near-abroad-soviet-states-in-check