Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

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THANOS DOKOS, THEODORE TSAKIRIS 110 Bulgaria Gas Interconnector (IGB) constitutes the first and most crucial link of this network. The IGB would run for around 20- 25 km in Greece, connecting the north-western city of Komotini with Bulgaria’s central city of Stara Zagora. The EEPR has earmarked €45 million for this project, which could be completed within 18-24 months from the beginning of its construction (originally scheduled to start in March 2012. Bulgaria’s state-controlled Bulgargaz signed a 1 bcm control with the Shan Deniz partners in September 2013; TAP may serve as a catalyst for the IGB, which has been plagued by the procrastination of the former Bulgarian government. It is through IGB and its connection with TAP that Greece can also start offer its north-eastern European neighbours the transit security that Nabucco failed to deliver. As of mid- 2014, the only missing parts of the puzzle were Bulgaria’s interconnectors with Romania (IBR) and Greece (IGB), although the IBR was finally constructed in March 2014. The pipeline was expected to be commissioned in June 2014. The selection of TAP over Nabucco in June 2013 facilitated the completion of Greece’s Eastern Balkans pipeline strategy, by creating a major impetus for Bulgaria to complete IGB by 2016, three years after its original timetable. As of August 2014, work on IGB has not even started, but DEPA believes that the pipeline will be commissioned within 2016. 16 GREEK FOREIGN POLICY AND ENERGY Even before the current crisis, Greece was consistently punching below its weight on most foreign and security policy issues, allowing itself to lose some of its regional influence in Southeastern Europe and letting its active role inside the European Union to atrophy. An inward looking and passive foreign policy led to very few foreign policy initiatives. The government failed to take advantage of opportunities for 16. “Bulgaria-Romania Gas Grid Interconnection to Become Functional in June”, Sofia News Agency, 26/03/2014, http://www.novinite.com/articles/159264
multilateral initiatives or to establish tactical and strategic alliances. Now Greek foreign policy needs to recalibrate in response to a changing regional and global security and economic environment, and support to the national effort to re-build the economy; furthermore it must achieve that goal with limited resources and under time pressure. Energy-related projects can be instrumental in Greece’s effort to repair its image, regain a leading role in the region, increase its influence, accumulate ‘diplomatic capital’, and boost economic growth in the medium- to long-term. In addition to TAP, Greece should try to enlarge its footprint in the energy map through other projects, including South Stream, as well as the exploitation of potential hydrocarbons deposits in various parts of the country, notably in Western Greece and the maritime areas to the southeast of Crete. While Greece should intensify its diplomatic efforts toward the delimitation of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and other maritime zones with neighbouring countries according to the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS, this should not unduly delay efforts to exploit natural resources in the aforementioned areas. In the context of its deep economic and political crisis, Greece went through a phase of hydrocarbon hysteria, where the Greek people, exhausted by the austerity policies, were looking for a magic formula, an easy way out of the economic crisis: energy resources fit the description perfectly. There are now more realistic public expectations and the Greek government has taken the necessary preliminary steps for research and exploitation of hydrocarbons by tendering exploration and production licenses in three areas in Western Greece (February 2012 - July 2013). It is preparing to issue a mega-tender for 20 offshore blocks which cover an area of 220,000 km2 spanning from the north of Corfu to the south-eastern part of Crete, possibly before the end of 2014. IT IS THROUGH IGB AND ITS CONNECTION WITH TAP THAT GREECE CAN ALSO START OFFER ITS NORTH-EASTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURS THE TRANSIT SECURITY THAT NABUCCO FAILED TO DELIVER. Although there have been no official statements or documents outlining a comprehensive Greek hydrocarbons exploration policy, looking at the Greek debate it is possible to present a basic outline: First, Greece does not wish to test its relations with neighbouring countries. Athens needs stability on the foreign policy front to facilitate recovery from the economic crisis. This is not suggest that Greece would not react to a move by another side attempting to change the bilateral status quo. Greece will play strictly by the international rules of the law of the sea, and that will include bilateral consultations with other countries with which Greece shares maritime zones. Talks are under way with Egypt, Albania and Libya, although the domestic situation in that country is rather chaotic, leaving very little room for substantive negotiations. It is not clear whether such talks will take place anytime soon with Turkey, despite the fact that there have been more than 60 rounds of high-level consultations between diplomats. Although it appears reasonable to 111 CASPIAN REPORT, FALL 2014
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CASPIAN PUBLISHED BY CASPIAN STRATE
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Dear Readers, CASPIAN REPORT 2 It i
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CASPIAN CASPIAN REPORT 4 06 FATIH M
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FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 6 THE U.S.
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FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 8 shale rev
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FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 10 in the 1
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FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 12 SINCE TH
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FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 14 these tw
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FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 16 LNG’s
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FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 18 kets, pa
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MANFRED HAFNER 20 THE SOUTHERN GAS
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MANFRED HAFNER 22 THE DOCUMENT RECO
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MANFRED HAFNER 24 Notwithstanding t
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MANFRED HAFNER 26 TANAP, A PROJECTE
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MANFRED HAFNER 28 by the Shah Deniz
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MANFRED HAFNER 30 Snam Rete Gas has
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MANFRED HAFNER 32 THE ESTABLISHMENT
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MATTEO VERDA 34 LNG MARKET: TRENDS
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MATTEO VERDA 36 traditionally accou
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MATTEO VERDA 38 bcm), Brunei (9 bcm
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MATTEO VERDA 40 for transport vesse
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MATTEO VERDA 42 of the global LNG m
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MUBARIZ HASANOV 44 AN OVERVIEW OF E
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MUBARIZ HASANOV 46 Figure 1. Primar
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MUBARIZ HASANOV 48 Figure 4. Real c
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Figure 7. Price of transport fuels
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Figure 10. Electricity generation i
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Figure 13. Breakdown of electricity
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THE SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR - WINDOW
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NINO KALANDADZE 58 become comprise
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Page 72 and 73: RADU DUDAU 70 RUSSIA HAS FREQUENTLY
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Page 90 and 91: WHY RUSSIA SIGNED A MAJOR GAS CONTR
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Page 96 and 97: Figure II: Russian energy infrastru
Page 98 and 99: Kazakhstan President Nursultan Naza
Page 100 and 101: MESUT HAKKI CASIN 98 economic devel
Page 102 and 103: Figure IV: China’s gas import sou
Page 104 and 105: THANOS DOKOS, THEODORE TSAKIRIS 102
Page 116 and 117: ARZU YORKAN 114 TURKEY’S RENEWABL
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Page 124 and 125: ARZU YORKAN 122 THE STRATEGY PAPER
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Page 132 and 133: EU Commission President Jean Claude
Page 134 and 135: ROMAN RUKOMEDA 132 THE PHANTOM OF R
Page 136 and 137: Russia’s gas giant Gazprom CEO, A
Page 138: CASPIAN CALL FOR PAPERS 136 Caspian
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Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

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