Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

such as the 2008 amendment to
the Law of Subsoil, which stipulates
that offshore projects are to be carried
out by companies in which the
Russian Federation is to hold an
interest of at least 50%, with more
than five years of industry experience.
In addition, if Russia conducts
further petroleum operations in the
offshore blocs adjoining Crimea, it
would face a technical and logistical
challenge: transportation of crude
oil and natural gas production to petroleum
terminals or mains. In this
respect, Russia will seek to develop
an energy transport infrastructure
over the Kerch Strait. Accordingly,
control over Crimea is a major cost
generator for Moscow.
The most important question for
countries in the region is a potential
reconsideration of borders of their
territorial seas, continental shelves
and EEZs, with Russia having taken
control of Crimea. Ukraine’s situation
has dramatic consequence from
multiple perspectives: economic,
military, and energy. According to
the UN Convention on Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (to which both Russia and
Ukraine are parties), a redefinition
of territorial borders in the Black
Sea and the Sea of Azov between
Ukraine and Russia would place a
virtual stranglehold on Ukraine’s access
to the Black Sea.
Ukraine would be left with a small
area throughout the southeastern
coast from the north point of Crimea
up to the mouth of the Danube and
a small part in the Sea of Azov, and
no access to the Kerch Strait. 11 Obviously,
the maritime borders, the
continental shelf and the EEZ are
elements that ought to be subject to
negotiation and agreement by the
riparian states, in compliance with
FOLLOWING THE SECESSION AND ANNEXATION
OF CRIMEA BY RUSSIA, ROMANIA HAS A DE FACTO
SITUATION COMMON BORDER WITH THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION IN THE BLACK SEA.
UNCLOS requirements. However, in
this case, Ukraine would be forced
to negotiate under the presence of
the Russian Black Sea fleet (which
will be felt even more strongly in
the future) and in the context of a
Russian-speaking population and
dependence on Russian gas supply.
In addition, Ukraine would not be
able to gain access to the open sea
other than through waters under
the jurisdiction of Romania or Russia.
Regarding access to the crossborder
waters of the Sea of Azov,
Russia holds full control through the
Kerch Strait.
Regardless of the validity of Russia’s
claim over Crimea, a redefinition
of borders in the Black Sea would
only directly affect Ukraine, raising
its security risks. For Bucharest, it
is important to know whether the
exercise of Russian sovereignty over
Crimea could justify – under the
treaties, the principles of international
law and the UNCLOS – a reconsideration
of the maritime borders
between Russia and Romania,
as an adjoining riparian state.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR ROMANIA
Romania and Ukraine have concluded
the Basic Treaty on good neighborliness
and friendly cooperation,
in force as of October 22, 1997. The
Treaty binds bilateral relationships
81
CASPIAN REPORT, FALL 2014
11.
In the context of Moscow’s efforts to strengthen an onshore link between Crimea and the
Russian mainland – a belt about 10 km wide along the coast of the Sea of Azov – the involvement
from mid-May of iron workers in Mariupol in taking over control from the breakaway pro-Russian
forces in the name of civil order and economic stability has been remarkable. In fact, it is obvious
that Ukrainian oligarchs are further playing an active role, demonstrating a striking sense of
opportunity.