30.12.2014 Views

Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Because of the decreasing trend of the<br />

EU domestic gas production, the EU gas<br />

import requirements have increased<br />

rapidly over the last decade.<br />

THE GENESIS OF THE SOUTHERN<br />

GAS CORRIDOR<br />

Gas is an essential component of the<br />

energy mix of the European Union<br />

(EU), constituting one quarter of primary<br />

energy supply and contributing<br />

mainly to electricity generation,<br />

heating, feedstock for industry and<br />

fuel for transportation.<br />

Because of the decreasing trend<br />

of the EU domestic gas production<br />

(particularly due the United Kingdom),<br />

the EU gas import requirements<br />

have increased rapidly over<br />

the last decade, leading to higher<br />

levels of import dependence and<br />

ultimately outlying the need to address<br />

the issue of security of gas supply<br />

at the EU level.<br />

This need unexpectedly became<br />

tangible in January 2006, when after<br />

a long-lasting disagreement on<br />

gas prices, Russia cut off supplies to<br />

Ukraine for 3 days, Ukraine diverted<br />

volumes destined to Europe, and as a<br />

consequence gas supply to some Central<br />

European countries fell briefly. 1<br />

As a response to the energy security<br />

concerns emerged after this Russian-Ukrainian-European<br />

gas crisis,<br />

the European Commission (EC)<br />

launched in 20<strong>08</strong> a double strategy,<br />

aimed at enhancing the EU gas security<br />

of supply architecture. On<br />

the one hand, the EC targeted to enhance<br />

the EU internal energy market<br />

in order to foster gas flows between<br />

EU Member States. On the other<br />

hand, it aimed at enhancing gas<br />

sources diversification, including<br />

building LNG receiving terminals in<br />

Central and South-East Europe and<br />

pursuing the 4 th corridor (generally<br />

known as Southern Gas Corridor) in<br />

order to bring gas from <strong>Caspian</strong> and<br />

Middle Eastern producing countries<br />

to the EU.<br />

The implementation of this strategy<br />

-and particularly of the Southern<br />

Gas Corridor- was accelerated after<br />

another major natural gas crisis between<br />

Russia and Ukraine occurred<br />

in January 2009. In fact, this crisis resulted<br />

to be even worse than the previous<br />

one, as the transit of Russian<br />

gas through Ukraine was completely<br />

cut for two weeks, which resulted in<br />

21<br />

CASPIAN REPORT, FALL <strong>2014</strong><br />

1.<br />

As Pirani, Stern and Yafimava underline natural gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine go back to the immediate aftermath of the<br />

independence of the two countries. Regular transit conflicts emerged as transit usually became a part of the price dispute on the<br />

Russian gas price for the Ukrainian domestic market. In fact, no separation between the transit gas network and the domestic gas<br />

network exists in Ukraine and Ukrainian customers usually served themselves from the transit volumes which Russia called theft of<br />

gas through the transit system. See: Pirani, S., Stern, J. and Yafimava, K. (2009), The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009:<br />

A Comprehensive Assessment, OIES paper: NG27, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!