Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

the European Commission and the
individual states proposed the development
of a collective international
energy policy more than two
decades ago. As early as in 1991, the
EU adopted the Energy Charter Declaration,
which identified the need
for the EU energy supply diversification
and called for a common vision.
13 In response to the gas crises,
the EU tabled the March 2006 Green
Paper on energy security. 14 The paper
recognised the danger of the
EU’s sole dependence on Russia, and
set out policy recommendations to
launch new partnerships with energy
producers in Caspian, Middle
Eastern, and North African regions.
However, as the negotiations with
Russia proceeded, it became clear
that the Charter was becoming a
“paper tiger,” while Russia had embraced
the “divide and rule” strategy,
and had gone ahead with striking bilateral
energy deals with individual
EU member states to undermine the
common vision for European energy
security. As a result, major EU states
such as France, Germany, Italy, although
well positioned to promote
13.
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf
diversification of energy supply,
have instead sought separate bilateral
agreements with Russia, undermining
the common EU policies.
The national energy companies of
IN RESPONSE TO THE GAS CRISES, THE EU
TABLED THE MARCH 2006 GREEN PAPER ON
ENERGY SECURITY.
these states, namely, Germany’s EON
Ruhrgas, Italy’s ENI and France’s
EDF have all signed bilateral deals
with Gazprom on future energy supplies.
15 Later on, Budapest and Sofia
joined the list of Russia’s gas consumers,
as Hungary’s MOL, the oil
and gas company, joined efforts with
Gazprom to expand the Blue Stream
pipeline project into Hungary passing
through the Black Sea and the
Balkans. 16 In 2008 and 2009, Bulgaria
and Slovenia respectively formalised
an arrangement with Gazprom,
thereby joining the planned South
Stream project. 17
Thus it seems that the European
states have thus far failed to implement
the common European Energy
14.
European Commission Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive
and Secure Energy, 2006 http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/
com2006_105_en.pdf
61
CASPIAN REPORT, FALL 2014
15.
In July 2006 Gazprom and E.ON AG signed a framework Agreement for asset exchange in
natural gas production, sales and trade and power industry. In August 2006, Gazprom Export
and E.ON Ruhrgas AG extended existing contracts and signed contract on gas supply through
NEGP. http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2006/august/article63576/. At the same time
Gazprom and Eni signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement. Under the deal, Gazprom was
to start supplying up to 3 billion cubic meters of gas per year directly to Italian market and
was allowed to acquire Eni’s stakes abroad. http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/italy/.
In November 27, 2009 Gazprom and Electricite de France (EDF) signed a Memorandum
of Understanding on EDF partially joining construction of the South Stream gas pipeline
envisioning to secure Gazprom’s stance on European markets, http://press.edf.com/pressreleases/all-press-releases/2009/gazprom-and-edf-sign-memorandum-45454.html.
For
further discussion see also, Vladimir Socor, Gazprom broadens, deepens inroads into European
Union’s internal markets, transport Systems, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 55, March
21, 2006, The Jamestown Foundation; http://www.jamestown.org/single/tx_ttnews[tt_
news]=31499&no_cache=1#.U6wH56hK6F4.
16.
Vladimir Socor, “Hungary signs South Stream Project Agreement”, World Security Network,
Feb. 2010 http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Energy-Security/Socor-Vladimir/
Hungary-Signs-South-Stream-Project-Agreement
17.
http://www.south-stream.info/en/pipeline/history/