Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

NINO KALANDADZE
62
Security policy. However with the
recent Ukrainian crisis there seems
to be light at the end of the tunnel.
Indeed, at their meeting in late
March 2014, European leaders decided
to undertake concrete steps
toward reducing Europe’s dependency
on gas and asked the European
Commission to propose a “comprehensive
plan” to enhance EU’s growing
energy independence, naming
the Southern Gas Corridor as a “key
element” in seeking energy supply
alternatives. 18 Given the current
limited export options along with
dominance of Russian pipelines and
the dependency on Russian Pipeline
infrastructure one of Europe’s best
options for its energy diversification
may indeed be the Southern Gas
Corridor.
B. THE SOUTHERN GAS
CORRIDOR - A WINDOW OF
OPPORTUNITY
The Southern Corridor is an initiative
of the European Commission to
supply Europe with gas from Caspian
and Middle Eastern regions. The
initiative was proposed in the European
Commission’s Communication
“Second Strategic Energy Review,
namely an “EU Energy Security and
Solidarity Action Plan.” 19 The Southern
Gas Corridor plans to transport
gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz
Field Phase II, across Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and Albania
into the EU, terminating in Italy. 20
The Corridor should consist of three
major pipelines: the existing South
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), a pipeline
of almost 700 km running from
Baku across Azerbaijan and Georgia
to the Turkish border. 21 The second
pipeline would be the planned
Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
(TANAP), an approximately
2000 km pipeline across Turkey, and
to the third planned pipeline, the
870 km line Trans Adriatic Pipeline
(TAP) to run across Greece, Albania
and along the seabed of the Adriatic
Sea into southern Italy. TANAP
should carry 16 bcm annually from
the SCP, leave 6 bcm in Turkey and
carry 10 bcm into EU territory. 22
Clearly, neither the volume nor the
geographic scale can position this
Corridor as Europe’s major alternative
route, or a full substitution for
the Russian supply. After all, the 10
bcm the SGC will carry to Europe
represents just 2% of the EU’s gas
consumption, as illustrated above.
As noted by Eurogas President Jean-
Francois Cirelli, the current volumes
of Russia’s gas supplies to Europe
cannot be entirely substituted by
other sources such as the SGC. 23
However, the strategic importance
of the SGC lies not necessarily in its
18.
European Commission, Newsletter, Energy in Europe, Editorial, March 2014, http://ec.europa.
eu/energy/newsletter/20140331-newsletter.htm
19.
EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, Second Strategic Energy Review, Commission of
The European Communities, Brussels 2008, COM 2008, 781 final, P. 4, http://eurlex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=COM:2008:0781:FIN:EN:PDF
20.
http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/Shahdeniz/SDstage2.html
21.
http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/SCP.html
22.
BP Press Release, Dec 2013, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/
shah-deniz-final-investment-decision-paves-way.html, Vladimir Socor, “SCP, TANAP, TAP:
Segments of the Southern Gas Corridor to Europe”, in Eurasia Daily Monitor V. 11 Issue: 8, The
Jamestown Foundation, January 15, 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/
single/tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41821&tx_ttnews[backPid]=641&cHash=
b1ec61bb21352f0b198410befb470539#.U6Q326hK6F4
23.
Rianovosti, 14.05.2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140514/189824573/Europe-Plans-No-
Extension-to-Southern-Gas-Corridor.html