Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which
will transport natural gas from Azerbaijan
to Italy via Greece and Albania, will
contribute to European energy security.
The global energy landscape is
changing, shaped by shifting patterns
of demand, new reserves
entering the production stage (including,
of course, the “shale gas
revolution” in the U.S.), new players,
alignments and evolving rules. Natural
and man-made disasters (such as
Fukushima), the EU economic crisis
and geopolitical crises in Ukraine,
Libya, Nigeria and Iraq also continue
to influence the energy sector and
the global economy in key ways.
The question of European energy
security and the need to diversify
Europe’s natural gas suppliers focused
attention on the strategic significance
of Southeastern Europe as
a transport hub for natural gas from
the Caspian region, and potentially
the Eastern Mediterranean. In order
to meet increasing natural gas
demand and reduce East and South
East Europe’s high levels of energy
dependency on a single exporter,
namely Russia, European authorities
have been keen to promote projects
that contribute to supply diversification.
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In this context, the Southern Gas
Corridor has an important role. The
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which
will transport natural gas from Azerbaijan
to Italy via Greece and Albania,
will contribute to European energy
security as well as providing a major
boost for Greece’s economy, regional
standing and ability to emerge as a
leading transit hub on a Southern-
Northern Axis. The combination of
TAP with a series of interconnecting
pipelines linking the Aegean with
the Baltic Sea, starting with Interconnector
Greece-Bulgaria (IGB),
will be key.
Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor
Strategy is based on the need to
maximize imports of non-Russian
gas via non-Russian controlled territory,
so as to establish a third, following
Russia, Norway and Northern Africa
(Algeria, Libya, Egypt), route of
supply diversification. As potential
sources of supply for the Southern
Gas Corridor, the European Commission
has recognised not only
Caspian (Azerbaijan) and Central
Asian gas (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
and primarily Turkmenistan) but
also Middle Eastern gas from Iraq’s
future production as well as from
the potential expansion of Egyptian
net exports, although the political
1.
EU’s primary energy security goals should be to reduce the strategic dependence of individual Member-States on single
external suppliers and to ensure that energy markets are liquid, open and functioning according to stable market rules
rather than power logics. Of course, energy security needs also needs to be balanced against environmental and economic
competitiveness concerns. (Dreyer & Stang, EU-ISS, p. 5)