Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

NINO KALANDADZE
66
tion of Crimea by Moscow, following
Kiev’s moves to sign an Association
Agreement with the EU. 37
THERE IS A NEED FOR A CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE
WESTERN POLICY, PARTICULARLY ON CONFLICT
RESOLUTION.
There are plenty of areas of vulnerabilities
in the Caucasus region that
may become useful tools in Moscow’s
hands. By far the most dangerous,
though, are the armed conflicts.
Azerbaijan and Armenia have unresolved
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Even if it seems somewhat stable
for the moment, the 2008 Russo-
Georgia war clearly demonstrated
how rapidly a “frozen conflict” can
turn into a hot war. Georgia’s Abkhazia
and Samachablo (South Ossetia/
Tskhinvali Region) are still under
Russian occupation. There is a Russian
military base in Gumri in Armenia,
controlled by Moscow. In addition,
Russian military forces actively
control Georgia’s two occupied territories.
This scenario seriously endangers
the security and stability of
the entire region. Should, e.g., the
situation in Karabakh escalate for
some reason, there is a significant
possibility that Moscow, backing its
strategic ally may connect its illegal
military base in Georgia’s Samachablo
with its Gumri base in Armenia,
further threatening Georgia’s territorial
integrity. The lack of any effective
international peacekeeping
or observer mission raises further
concerns in this respect. 38
As described by Sipos-Kecskemethy,
once aware of the multiple options
for transporting trans-Caspian hydrocarbons
to Europe via the South
Caucasus, the Black Sea and Ukraine,
the EU changed its “homogeneous”
attitude to the former Soviet region,
drawing upon its soft-power capacity
by including some of those countries
in its European Neighbourhood
Policy 39 as well as the Eastern
European Partnership initiative. In
case of Georgia and Ukraine, the EU
went further and signed Association
Agreements. 40 NATO has also, gradually,
become an important player in
the region. After engaging in several
cooperative rapprochement mechanisms,
it even made a pledge at the
2008 Bucharest Summit, promising
Georgia and Ukraine NATO membership
at some future date. 41
Nevertheless there is a clear deficit
of a concrete and comprehensive
long-term strategy in relation to
37.
Moscow put immense economic and political pressure on Ukraine’s previous Administration
to dissuade it from signing the Association Agreement with the EU, ultimately leading to
then President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the deal with the EU during the EaP summit
in Vilnius, triggering mass demonstrations in Kiev. See also “Ukraine #1 – Agreements,
Protests and Sanctions: A Chronology of Events, Untold Europe, March 2014, http://
www.untoldeurope.eu/ukraine-1-protests-agreements-sanctions-chronology-events/,
Peter Beaumont, “Russia makes latest high-risk move to keep pieces of its “near abroad”
in check, The Observer, March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/
russia-moves-keep-near-abroad-soviet-states-in-check
38.
The European Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was established by the EU following the 2008 war
and has been operating on Georgia’s territory since then. However the monitors are effectively,
though illegally, denied access to the occupied territories by the de facto authorities of
breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus they have been unable thus far to fully carry out
their mandate, which includes monitoring of Georgia’s entire territory, see also http://www.
eumm.eu/en/about_eumm
39.
Sipos-Kecskemethy, “Energy security and the Caucasus Region”, Aarms, vol. 8, N. 3, 2009,
p.408
40.
Lawrence Peter, BBC News, June 27, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28038725
41.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm