Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

THANOS DOKOS, THEODORE TSAKIRIS
104
instability which has plagued Iraq,
Syria and Egypt has suspended their
export potential in the short to medium-term.
2
Any discussion of the TAP (which
won the tender to transport Azerbaijani
gas to Europe via Turkey) and
Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
(TANAP) requires an analysis of
the geopolitical environment which
– to a large extent - determined its
eventual selection. The examination
of the geopolitical underpinnings
of TAP and its sister project TANAP
THE GEOPOLITICAL NOTION OF ENERGY TRADE
AS A COMPONENT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL EMPOWERMENT IS NOT EXCLUSIVE TO
THE PRODUCING OR EXPORTING STATES.
along with their impact on the regional
balance of power is important
for three principal reasons:
i. The region these pipelines will
have to cross in order to connect
the upstream producer (currently
Azerbaijan, and in the longer term
Iraq and/or Turkmenistan) with
the main transit states (Georgia and
Turkey) and finally the consumers in
South East and Central Europe suffers
from endemic instability. The
attendant threat primarily relates to
the possibility of disrupting the flow
of natural gas through these pipelines
after they are constructed. For
instance, this affected Azerbaijani
exports to Turkey during the 2008
Russian-Georgian War. 3
ii. The region’s net energy exporters
attribute an important geopolitical
significance to their oil and
gas exports. These exports not only
represent an important financial
transaction which accounts for a
major component of their respective
GDPs and budgetary revenues; 4
they also represent a declaration of
diplomatic intent, a marker geopolitical
orientation and an extension
of its foreign policy. For Azerbaijan,
the principal (if not sole) arbiter of
the Southern Gas Corridor Strategy,
energy export policy is “a means of
consolidating its sovereignty”, according
to Dr. Elhur Soltanov of
Azerbaijan’s Diplomatic Academy. 5
iii: The geopolitical notion of energy
trade as a component of foreign
policy and national empowerment is
not exclusive to the producing or exporting
states. Several of the potential
transiting states, namely Georgia,
Turkey, Greece, and even Albania,
do not only want to secure stable
and affordable natural gas supplies.
They want to see diplomatic gains
through the transit of these supplies
through their own territory, for reasons
that go beyond their immediate
energy needs. In the case of Albania,
for instance, those needs are practically
non-existent since the country’s
natural gas consumption is extremely
low.
2.
See inter alia, Gulmira Rzayeva & Theodoros Tsakiris, Strategic Imperative: Azerbaijani Gas
Strategy and the EU’s Southern Corridor, SAM Center for Strategic Studies under the President of
Azerbaijan, SAM Review #5, (Baku: June 2012), pp.6-13.
3.
The flow of gas continued through the Turkish component of the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline that
links Baku and Erzurum via Tbilisi. “BP: Gas Still Flowing on the Turkish Side of the South Caucasus
Pipe”, DowJones, 12/08/2008.
4.
In 2010, oil & gas exports amounted to 90% of Azeri exports that according to the CIA World Fact
Book (updated to 12/07/2011) amounted to approximately $28,07 billion compared to a state
budget of $28,83 billion in 2010. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/aj.html
5.
Elhur Soltanov, Azerbaijan’s Energy Policy: Balancing North and East, Going West, paper presented
at IENE’s 5th South East Europe Energy Dialogue, (Thessaloniki: 2-3 June 2011), p.2.