Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

aly, that operate in the area through
energy companies.
Currently, the key destabilising factor
in this process os U.S. involvement.
Romania, as a geographically
peripheral member of the EU and
NATO, stands to gain from such
political and territorial security
guarantees. However, in terms of
energy, 15 as long as at the EU level
no serious joint policy 16 is outlined,
Bucharest will have to rely primarily
on its own analyses in forming strategic
alliances.
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CASPIAN REPORT, FALL 2014
15.
We made a comparison between the annexation of Crimea, alongside the effects that it may
generate in the Black Sea area, and the situation in Cyprus. For nearly half a century, the situation
in Cyprus could not be resolved either by the EU or NATO. The Greek-Turkish confrontation
significantly affects the development of offshore projects in the Mediterranean. Turkey refuses
to recognize territorial borders drawn by Cyprus and the petroleum concessions granted
by Cyprus, and hence offshore exploration petroleum activities in the area (see the case of
exploration company Noble Energy in 2011), overlapping their exploration activities in both
Cypriot and Greek waters (accompanied by Turkish military ships) and threatening with military
intervention. Tensions between the two countries are far from being calmed down. Turkey
is not a party to UNCLOS, while the EU is a party thereto, so UNCLOS is part of the acquis
communautaire.
16.
Relevant to the region’s energy security equation would also be the European elections this year.
The prevalence of the European right wing in such elections, lately heavily romanced by Russia,
could decelerate integration processes and affect operation of any alliances or any joint stances
Romania may take in an attempt to manage the situation of energy projects in the Black Sea in
its relationship with Russia.