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Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

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NINO KALANDADZE<br />

58<br />

become comprise a key part of the<br />

West’s plan for implementing its energy<br />

security concept.<br />

A. EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY<br />

I. INTRODUCTION<br />

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has<br />

made the West, and especially the<br />

EU, rethink its strategy toward Moscow.<br />

Once again Western governments<br />

are questioning Russia’s reliability<br />

as a partner in international<br />

affairs. Energy security is high on<br />

the EU agenda. The crisis is unlikely<br />

to be resolved any time soon, and<br />

Kremlin’s threats to cut off Ukraine’s<br />

gas supply, unless it pays the price<br />

set by Moscow, are increasingly loud.<br />

History is repeating itself. Similar<br />

gas disputes have characterised the<br />

recent past, carried out by Moscow<br />

against its neighbours, including<br />

Georgia, 1 Belarus, 2 and Ukraine. In<br />

the latter case, several Central and<br />

Western European countries were<br />

also left without gas supply. 3 Today,<br />

again, talks on how to negotiate with<br />

Russia are topping the agendas in<br />

the EU’s national parliaments. Risks<br />

to Europe’s energy security are<br />

becoming more and more urgent,<br />

given that approximately 50% of<br />

Russia’s supply to the West is still delivered<br />

through Ukraine, making up<br />

a significant proportion of EU’s annual<br />

gas consumption. Against this<br />

background, Western policy makers<br />

are powerfully aware of the need for<br />

a common strategy to diversify Europe’s<br />

energy supply sources. Even if<br />

currently it seems unrealistic to substitute<br />

the Russian supply in full, an<br />

effective alternative must be found at<br />

least to replace the volumes threatened<br />

by the prolongation of the Russian<br />

– Ukrainian crisis.<br />

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND<br />

AND CHALLENGES OF<br />

DIVERSIFICATION<br />

Access to natural resources such as<br />

hydrocarbons has for decades represented<br />

one of the major challenges<br />

for international security and stability.<br />

So far, there seems to be no clearalternative<br />

to substitute fossil energy,<br />

excluding nuclear energy with the<br />

latter requiring huge financial investment<br />

and bearing high political costs.<br />

Thus gas and oil remain the preferred<br />

energy sources for a major part of the<br />

world economy. 4 According to a 2013<br />

survey, EU member states are collectively<br />

the world’s largest energy im-<br />

1.<br />

January 2006, two blasts shut down the main pipeline supplying Georgia with Russian gas, leaving the country without gas<br />

during one of its coldest winters. The Georgian government classified the attacks as deliberate action against Georgia.<br />

The view that this was done deliberately by Russia is substantiated by the fact that explosions took place in the Russiancontrolled<br />

North Ossetia, bordering Georgia’s then breakaway South Ossetia (fully occupied by Russian military forces),<br />

suspiciously coinciding with the scandalous discovery and public handover of Russian spies by the Georgian government.<br />

Finally, the attacks were preceded by gas disputes Russia against Moldova and Ukraine, providing further credence to this<br />

assumption. (For further discussion see Victor Yasman, Russia: “Is Georgian Gas Crisis Evidence of Moscow’s New Energy<br />

Strategy Radio Free Liberty, January 2006.<br />

2.<br />

Russia vs. Belarus gas disputes stretched out over a decade, emerging in 2004 alongside other Russia-Belarus disputes<br />

that were to follow almost every year, including gas cut-offs and disputes. Largely, it was understood as a politically<br />

motivated move on behalf of Russia, as Gazprom hoped to gain control over Beltransgaz and of its 6,000 km of pipelines,<br />

and thereby of the gas transit route delivering gas to Europe. (For further discussion see Chloe Bruce, fraternal Friction or<br />

Fraternal fiction: The Gas Factor in Russian-Belarusian Relations, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March 2005.<br />

3.<br />

David Gow, “Russia-Ukraine Gas Crises intensifies as all European Supplies are cut off”, theguardian.com, Jan 2009. http://<br />

www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jan/07/gas-ukraine<br />

4.<br />

International Energy Outlook 2013, US Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/nat_gas.cfm,<br />

see also “Recent trends in the Global Energy Oil & Gas Economy”, IISS – Oberoi Lecture, IISS, 14 August <strong>2014</strong>, http://www.<br />

iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2013-5126/august-1e98/recent-trends-in-global-energy-1218

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