Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

THANOS DOKOS, THEODORE TSAKIRIS
112
ENERGY-RELATED PROJECTS CAN BE
INSTRUMENTAL IN GREECE’S EFFORT TO REPAIR
ITS IMAGE, REGAIN A LEADING ROLE IN THE
REGION, INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE, ACCUMULATE
‘DIPLOMATIC CAPITAL’, AND BOOST ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN THE MEDIUM- TO LONG-TERM.
assume that all the main ideas, options
and scenarios for addressing
bilateral issues have been discussed
in the context of such deliberations,
Turkey has adamantly opposed any
discussion of the delimitation of the
respective exclusive economic zones
of the two countries. Furthermore,
both sides currently have other domestic
and foreign policy priorities
(especially in view of the arc of crisis
extending from Ukraine to Mashrek
and the Persian Gulf). Moreover, the
relative stability and predictability
of their bilateral relations allow
them to put the resolution of bilateral
differences on the back burner.
It should be noted, though, that Turkey’s
non-recognition of the Republic
of Cyprus - whose EEZ borders
the respective zones of both Turkey
and Greece - seriously complicates
the situation.
Second, the importance of potential
hydrocarbon deposits for economic
recovery and national energy security
in the minds of Greek decision-makers
cannot be emphasised
enough. Greece will claim any substantial
deposits in her maritime
zones, as defined by the international
law of the sea. No Greek government
- irrespective of ideological
orientation -can afford to neglect
that course of action. To achieve that
goal, Greece will use a variety of political
and diplomatic means, including
cooperation with countries and
companies with similar interests. In
this context, the concept of common
EU maritime policy and maritime
zones will also be used, despite its
(currently) largely symbolic value.
But Greece will also emphasise the
importance of potential hydrocarbon
discoveries for European energy
security, along with the existing and
possible new discoveries in the EEZs
of Cyprus and Israel.
Third, problems with neighbouring
countries around the exploration
of hydrocarbons may only arise if
substantial deposits are discovered
in disputed areas. Even then, however,
the international law of the sea
offers mutually satisfactory solutions,
and more importantly, allow
them to sell such an agreement to
their respective publics. A necessary
precondition would of course be
relevant political will and the adherence
to UNCLOS. Greece may not, in
principle, be opposed to “win-win”
solutions, even including joint exploitation
of resources, provided, of
course, that issues of borders and
ownership have been settled in advance.
In addition, Greece will likely try to
enlarge its footprint on the energy
map through other projects, in addition
to the exploitation of potential
hydrocarbons deposits in various
parts of the country, notably in
Western Greece and the maritime
areas south of Crete. In a difficult period
for Greece, such energy projects
provide an excellent opportunity for
diplomatic and economic gains.
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
HYDROCARBONS
The discovery of significant natural
gas deposits in the exclusive economic
zones of Israel and Cyprus
and the prospective deposits of the
Levant Basin may provide an additional
energy source outside the
former Soviet space and the Middle
East proper, thereby contributing
to the diversification of Europe’s
natural gas supplies. Although the