Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

RADU DUDAU
70
RUSSIA HAS FREQUENTLY USED ENERGY AS A
GEOPOLITICAL TOOL, ESPECIALLY IN ITS SELF-
PROCLAIMED “NEAR NEIGHBOURHOOD.”
logue with the EU. The structured
dialogue between the EU and Russia
was promoted mainly at the EU’s
initiative, through the Energy Charter
(pending Moscow’s ratification),
the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement of 1994, and the Energy
Dialogue launched in 2000. However,
none of these initiatives yielded
legally binding instruments or any
permanent institutional mechanism.
It is precisely the absence of an institutional
framework for politicalstrategic
dialogue that reflects the
difference in vision, approach and
strategy.
The shock generated by the Yukos
affair was in line with the Kremlin’s
intention to bring Russia back to
the forefront of global politics. In
2007, at the Munich Security Conference,
Vladimir Putin invited Russia’s
Western partners to accept Russia
as it is, to offer an equal treatment
and establish cooperation based on
mutual interest.
The conflict between geopolitical
aspirations, Russia’s “national resurgence”
under Putin’s regime, and
the structured dialogue that underpinned
the relationship with the
EU began to take its toll, by introducing
obvious elements of power
politics to Russia’s energy strategy.
Key examples in this respect include
natural gas crises with Ukraine in
1990, 2006 and 2009 as well as the
damage to Georgia’s reputation as a
transit country following the armed
conflict in August 2008. Russia has
frequently used energy as a geopolitical
tool, especially in its selfproclaimed
“near neighbourhood”
(the peripheral and energy transit
countries, former USSR members)
and the Central and East European
area (namely in countries deemed
economically or politically vulnerable
in the bilateral relationship with
Russia). This tactic has been widely
regarded as an expression of Russia’s
economic weaknesses.
Increasingly, Russia began to frame
energy security in strategic, political
and military terms (as well as commercial),
like its Western partners.
Recognising energy security as a key
element of national security is only
a small step away from the militarisation
of economic/energy disputes.
Moreover, if energy security takes
a hard security dimension, the economic
factor becomes politicised,
further complicating inter-state arrangements
and leading to increased
security risks.
The increasing militarisation 1 of
Russia’s foreign policy has been
highlighted by the Kremlin’s approach
to the regime change in Kiev
and the subsequent events. Consequently,
in order to preserve its
strategic interests in the Black Sea
area, Russia followed “by the book”
military tactics and immediately
covered the South Ukrainian flank.
It strangled Ukraine’s sea access by
encouraging the secession of Crimea
and its subsequent and annexation
to the Russian Federation. 2 This
reinforced Moscow’s military presence
on the Black Sea, while at the
same time playing diversion in East
Ukraine with a view to strengthen
the status quo in Crimea. However,
1.
Reference is made to “militarisation” in a broad sense, including subversive, diversionary acts as
well as regular troops manoeuvres.
2.
Onsite reports indicate that special research-diversion troops were used in this respect; the
absence of military emblems on uniforms was aimed at justification in terms of international law.