Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Invasive ...

Chapter 4: Spartina Control and Management<strong>Proceedings</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Third</strong> <strong>International</strong> <strong>Conference</strong> on Invasive Spartinapolitical leadership to restrict <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> funds. Agencieswere forbidden from using funds for research, even studiesthat would directly improve <strong>the</strong> efficiency and effectiveness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> control program. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>of</strong>ficially-sanctionedstudies, evaluations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> costs and benefits <strong>of</strong> controltechniques were done using grant funds cobbled toge<strong>the</strong>r.Control technique trials were not conducted to providereliable information on <strong>the</strong> efficacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tools. Alternativestrategies could not be compared. Good consistent recordswere not kept. No agency could compare <strong>the</strong>ir work witho<strong>the</strong>rs. The control program was conducted year after yearwithout a good understanding <strong>of</strong> how well <strong>the</strong> tools and <strong>the</strong>application strategies actually worked.The lack <strong>of</strong> objective quantitative information harmed<strong>the</strong> personal relations among both <strong>the</strong> allied agencies andlocal stakeholders as well. More and more frequently,interagency meetings provided <strong>the</strong> occasion for majorsquabbles over whe<strong>the</strong>r particular treatment techniques weresufficiently effective to continue <strong>the</strong>ir use. Withoutdefinitive studies, <strong>the</strong> subjectivity inherent in our argumentscould not be overcome. The tension and distrust generatedby <strong>the</strong>se irresolvable debates eventually led factions to stoptalking.If I had it to do over, I would have spent much moretime selling our politicians and <strong>the</strong> public on <strong>the</strong> need forgood rigorous science and monitoring. We should have triedto learn how to kill Spartina effectively and affordably at <strong>the</strong>very start. A rigorous comparison <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tools should havebeen conducted to determine <strong>the</strong> conditions for maximumefficiency <strong>of</strong> each. We should also have gotten an earlierstart on <strong>the</strong> feasibility <strong>of</strong> biological control, and startedlooking for alternative chemicals soon after hearing from ourfriends in Australia and New Zealand that glyphosate doesnot work well on Spartina.LESSON 6: THINK AHEAD AND SHARE YOUR VISIONMy experience has convinced me that long-termplanning is very necessary despite <strong>the</strong> discomfort andhumility you may feel in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> many seemingly criticalunknowns. By taking a decent stab at planning, youcommunicate that you are serious about solving <strong>the</strong> problemin a logical and efficient manner. If all <strong>the</strong> facts are notavailable, assumptions will have to do for <strong>the</strong> time being.The concept <strong>of</strong> adaptive management is nothing more than<strong>the</strong> explicit promise to update your plan as you learn fromexperience. You are likely to attract <strong>the</strong> money you needonly if you have a compelling and well-defined plan <strong>of</strong>action. You are also likely to draw important allies if yourvision is clear and convincing. If you are asking citizens toaccept <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> chemical applications as a major part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>program, you had better have an endpoint in mind and beprepared to explain why it will take you that long to get<strong>the</strong>re. You need a flexible timetable. You need graphicimages showing how you can succeed with <strong>the</strong> resourcesyou have at hand. Then you need to take your vision forsuccess on <strong>the</strong> road and sell it to <strong>the</strong> key stakeholders.LESSON 7: CONSOLIDATED SYSTEMATIC PROGRESSOver <strong>the</strong> years, it became more and more apparent thatwe would make no progress unless we could eliminate largecontiguous blocks <strong>of</strong> Spartina in a systematic fashion.Ra<strong>the</strong>r than dispersing <strong>the</strong> control effort here and <strong>the</strong>rearound <strong>the</strong> Bay, we needed to consolidate our efforts. Tolimit re-infestation from nearby untreated areas, we adopteda strategy <strong>of</strong> working in consolidated blocks. Theoreticalweed management models advise that all outliers should betreated first in order to minimize <strong>the</strong> overall long-term costs.Logistical realities in Willapa Bay make <strong>the</strong> “outliers first”strategy untenable. Few tides are sufficiently low to allowtime for effective treatment <strong>of</strong> all outliers before o<strong>the</strong>r parts<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> infestation are tackled. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outliers were alsoon private lands, while an agency’s first priorities are <strong>the</strong>irown lands. Chemical applications <strong>of</strong> glyphosate required drytimes rarely available where <strong>the</strong> outliers occur. The timerequired and costs <strong>of</strong> moving heavy equipment dictate thatcrews limit hopping, skipping, and backtracking as much aspossible. It is also far easier to keep track <strong>of</strong> where you haveleft <strong>of</strong>f if <strong>the</strong> progression <strong>of</strong> treatments is simple andmethodical. Based on <strong>the</strong>se practical considerations, ourcrews have adopted a strategy <strong>of</strong> sweeping Spartina from <strong>the</strong>eastern side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bay first and <strong>the</strong>n finishing up on <strong>the</strong>west side. The federal crews are moving from south to north,while <strong>the</strong> state crews in general are operating from north tosouth.For many years, most parties were driven by narrowself-interest. Under those conditions, it was impossible tocreate a coherent and effective strategy. The lack <strong>of</strong> any—even a flawed—long-term vision allowed agencies to pursue<strong>the</strong>ir own near-term interests without political consequences.No one had <strong>the</strong> authority or permission to impose <strong>the</strong>discipline <strong>of</strong> working toge<strong>the</strong>r to treat some lands first,o<strong>the</strong>rs later, and some at <strong>the</strong> very end. Without such a multiyearcommitment, no one had confidence <strong>the</strong> program wouldlast long enough to serve <strong>the</strong>ir own interests. The brevity <strong>of</strong>budget periods constrained long-term thinking. With federalbudgets set on an annual basis and state budgets set everytwo years, <strong>the</strong>re were no absolute guarantees that <strong>the</strong>funding would be maintained to <strong>the</strong> very end. Still, with awell thought-out plan and <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> all parties, you candraw toge<strong>the</strong>r enough political will to have a good shot atsustaining <strong>the</strong> program over <strong>the</strong> required number <strong>of</strong> years.LESSON 8: LOSE THE THIN SKINI have to conclude with some cautionary words about<strong>the</strong> emotional toll that comes with difficult challenges likecontrolling a widespread invasive weed. Weed eradicationwork in <strong>the</strong> field is tough and dirty business. People get hurt,- 232 -