60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

126 development dialogue december 2008 – revisiting the heart of darkness
In other words, there are four main characteristics [of extremely
violent societies] – various victim groups, broad participation, multicausality,
and a great amount of physical violence (Gerlach 2006: 460;
emphases added).
Gerlach would seem to imply that the concept of ‘genocide’ only allows
for a single victim group, that it excludes the notion of popular
participation, limits the perpetrators to certain elite formations,
and most usually casts the state in the role of perpetrator. In addition
Gerlach argues that ‘by various defi nitions, “genocide” excludes
or neglects many sorts of violence…such as enforced resettlement,
forced labour, deliberate inadequate supplies or excessive imprisonment’
(Gerlach 2006: 464). As valid as these claims may be, Gerlach
nonetheless does not defi ne either the concept of genocide which he
targets or ‘the genocide model’ to which he repeatedly refers (Gerlach
2006: 463, 465, 466), instead noting that ‘there is no commonly accepted
defi nition of genocide’ (Gerlach 2006: 463; see 465).
Gerlach’s argument nonetheless has the considerable merit of challenging
the predominant focus in the literature on the role of the
state and public offi cials instigating, organising and executing genocide.
For genocide scholars and historians more generally are inclined
to emphasise the category of ‘state genocide’. As Gerlach
notes, this is particularly true of analyses of Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union whereas he introduces an important caveat that is, in
my view, problematic. For asserting that the ‘traditional’ mode of
analysing ‘mass violence has focused on the state – scholars were
basically dealing with state crimes, with what was perceived as centralised
machineries, or bureaucracies’ – Gerlach makes the strong
claim that this mistaken focus ‘explicitly or implicitly’ evokes ‘the
model of totalitarianism’ (Gerlach 2006: 459). Thus although Gerlach
does not dispute in principle the important role of ‘the state’
and ‘state functionaries as such’ in what he terms ‘mass violence’,
nonetheless he supports an approach that would ‘overcome’ ‘Eurocentric
models such as state crimes based on “totalitarianism”’ (Gerlach
2006: 459). Clearly in Gerlach’s view the so-called ‘totalitarian
model’ has left a deep imprint on genocide studies, not only obscuring
‘the origins of the violence’ but also failing to account for the
‘twisted ways of decision-making and of the realization of policies’.
In short, the ‘model of totalitarianism’ posits ‘relatively straight and
one-dimensional ways from intentions to actual violence’ that are
derived from a too narrow focus on the dictator, ‘political ideologies
and political systems’ (Gerlach 2006: 459).