60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

Conclusion
do we need an alternative to the concept of genocide? 149
In view of the considerable overlap between the concepts of crimes
against humanity and extremely violent societies Gerlach’s contention
that we need an ‘alternative’ to the concept of genocide fails to
convince. Having said that, there are several points that Gerlach raises
that are extremely important and instructive.
Thus the question of the participation of non-state, autonomous social
groups in acts of mass violence and mass crimes is both topical and of
great theoretical signifi cance. This is nowhere more apparent than in
the Rwanda genocide of 1994. For, as Kenneth Harrow argues:
It was the concordance of a sustained campaign of propaganda,
the organisation of the Interahamwe around the ideological claims
of the Hutu Nationalist CDR extremists…and the failures of the
Habyarimana government or the UN to stop the sporadic attacks
on Tutsis in the northwest province that provided the fodder for
the fantasy that the Tutsis were no longer ‘us’, no longer ‘subjects’,
but were inyenzi (cockroaches) that had to be stamped out (Harrow
2005: 38; emphasis added).
Therefore quite independently of the debate surrounding the concept
of genocide, there is an urgent need to comprehend and theorise
the phenomenon of mass participation in mass crimes instigated and
propagated, inter alia, by non-state or sub-state, autonomous social
groups. Indeed, this is one of the most pressing items on the agenda
of the social sciences, and it remains one of the least understood phenomena
of the modern age.
By way of a conclusion I would like to summarise my fi ndings in
regard to Gerlach’s proposed alternative to the concept of genocide.
Firstly, if Gerlach makes certain telling points against the current restrictive
terms of the Genocide Convention, these can only be sustained
on the assumption that we are without other categories of international
criminal law that could, and do, accommodate his central
concerns. Thus I think it striking that many of his criticisms of the
concept or model of genocide are more appropriately directed at many
genocide scholars. In other words, it is diffi cult to see why we should
reject a concept simply because it is routinely misinterpreted. Conversely,
much of the debate about the concept of genocide is conducted
in a theoretical vacuum, with many scholars condemning a
concept they defi ne poorly, or not at all, and without placing this
narrow debate within the broader context of the instruments and