60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
contextualising violence in colonial africa 69<br />
environment. Origins of confl ict appear to be related to specifi c control<br />
relations in development which suggest a possible defi nition of<br />
‘empire’ beyond territorial rule or formal empire.<br />
Secondly, <strong>the</strong> argument about lineages of confl ict shows <strong>the</strong> importance<br />
of an additional dimension to <strong>the</strong> controversy about <strong>the</strong> violent<br />
versus <strong>the</strong> ‘ramshackle’ colonial state. The colonial state was perhaps<br />
not a rational and self-contained instrument of bureaucratic power,<br />
and certainly not infi nitely successful in its agency (Berman 1997 vs.<br />
Young 1994). Nei<strong>the</strong>r were colonial policies consistently supporting<br />
metropolitan economic accumulation (Berman and Lonsdale 1980),<br />
let alone conducive to <strong>the</strong> stated welfare objectives of European nation<br />
states. Yet colonial states were still subject to <strong>the</strong> developmental<br />
vagaries of <strong>the</strong> imperial state. It was this framework in which colonies<br />
became solicited by, reacted to, or were ignored by <strong>the</strong> imperial<br />
centre.<br />
Thirdly, in <strong>the</strong> debate about <strong>the</strong> postcolonial state and violence it has<br />
been suggested that social relations of domination were due to conditions<br />
of scarce resources under which some states operate (Bayart<br />
1993: ch. 9). Alternatively, authors have attributed <strong>the</strong> existence of oppressive<br />
postcolonial regimes to <strong>the</strong> legitimisation of <strong>the</strong>se states in <strong>the</strong><br />
international order, implying that <strong>the</strong> international state-system was<br />
in need of reform (Jackson/Rosberg 1986). But <strong>the</strong> present argument<br />
about confl ict, nation states and empire would suggest that <strong>the</strong> strategies<br />
and mechanisms that could engender violence were peculiar to a<br />
given state and also structured in historical context. The mechanisms<br />
of control in colonial empires were very specifi c. Moreover, since lineages<br />
of confl ict were part and parcel of constructions of European<br />
national development <strong>the</strong>y were not subject to reconsideration in any<br />
simple manner. The means of control also diff ered widely between<br />
states. Formally independent non-Western states ‘imported’ <strong>the</strong> modern<br />
state not least in order to cement <strong>the</strong> rule of <strong>the</strong> old state’s elite<br />
with new techniques of administration and policing (Badie 2000: ch.<br />
3). Doctrines of <strong>the</strong> colonial state were primarily discussed in <strong>the</strong> imperial<br />
centre. In Western states, it was economic and political power<br />
that conveyed a wider range of control options in international relations.<br />
Yet <strong>the</strong>se states, too, were not only constrained by problems of<br />
economic management but also trapped by <strong>the</strong>ir assumptions about<br />
<strong>the</strong> requirements of control in normative development.<br />
This observation would seem to underscore, fourthly, <strong>the</strong> argument<br />
that <strong>the</strong> use of force in <strong>the</strong> colonial world was rooted in Western ideas<br />
of modernisation as universal evolution. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> development