60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

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224 development dialogue december 2008 – revisiting the heart of darkness Anti-urban campaign Clearly the government was angry with the urban population for deserting ZANU-PF and shifting its loyalty to the opposition MDC. These people needed to be punished, they needed to be removed and scattered as the farmworker communities had been during the farm invasions. Murambatsvina can be described then as a programme of social engineering, not on the scale of Pol Pot’s Kampuchea, but similar in type. If the urban population becomes restive, return it to its rural origins, where it will be more controllable. Subsequent increases in the powers and privileges of traditional leaders demonstrate this general ability of ZANU-PF to exercise their control more eff ectively in rural communities. 11 Re-asserting control of the economy An informal economy creates collectively considerable wealth, which is diffi cult for government revenue collectors to tap or regulatory bodies to control. There is also no doubt that many informal traders, although a small minority, were engaging in illegal transactions, both in foreign exchange and in stolen goods. As the black market in both goods and currency ballooned, the government needed to regain control if infl ation was to be tamed and order restored. In the face of a shrinking economy, government revenues were drying up, and the government needed to control all commercial activity in order to tax it. Government usurping functions of local authorities There is some indication that central government was using the operation to assume control of patronage-prone functions of local government – the issuing of trading licences and allocation of housing stands or houses. This might give them the capacity to re-assert control in towns in spite of opposition-dominated local authorities. In the wake of Murambatsvina, this assumption has been vindicated as all the houses built under Garikayi (only a few thousand in total, and mainly of very poor quality with no water or sewerage) have been allocated by central government (Solidarity Peace Trust 2006: 26-36). Vendors must now be fi nger-printed and vetted by central government before being allowed to buy licences from local authorities. 11 Chiefs have recently gained greater judicial powers and their allowances and benefi ts have been substantially increased. These helped to buy their loyalty to ZANU-PF, to be demonstrated by denying civil rights and even the right to purchase food to members of the opposition in rural areas. Democratic space has been closed down even faster in rural areas than in towns.
mass violence in zimbabwe 2005 – murambatsvina 225 Internal ZANU-PF power struggle Some suggest that Murambatsvina could have been a side-show for the on-going power struggle within ZANU-PF. But if this is the case, it is not clear whose interests it promoted, and who were to be disadvantaged. Some of the razed settlements were sponsored by individual politicians, as were some of the black market foreign currency syndicates, and many war veterans and party members lost their homes and businesses in the operation. But the destruction was not selective and there does not seem to be any clear indication of which individuals and party factions benefi ted. An operation of this kind could not have been launched and sustained, however, without authority from the top and support from the upper levels of the security establishment, which in fact is probably where it originated. In this case it would be the faction of ZANU-PF most closely aligned to the military and Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) who would have benefi ted, but this is yet to be demonstrated. Pre-empting opposition resistance to ZANU-PF rule Murambatsvina began less than two months after the parliamentary election in March 2005, an election which was clearly deeply fl awed. The urban population was restive, facing a winter of increasing infl ation, food shortage and deteriorating quality of life. The government feared extra-parliamentary opposition and it is probable that the general motive was to take the initiative to disorganise any potential organised activity, by disorientating the opposition support base at the most fundamental level. Those struggling to fi nd shelter and food for their families would have little capacity for organised protest, let alone an uprising. The aim was to show Zimbabweans that ZANU-PF was in full control and not shy to use every weapon at their disposal. Retaining power ZANU-PF’s primary motivation for any policy decision has been to retain power. As it has become increasingly panicky in the face of failing policies, a collapsed economy and widespread unpopularity escalating to bitter hatred, it has become steadily more vicious. Political issues of control take priority, with the economic and social consequences either disregarded or totally misunderstood. Those members of the government who caution against the irrational are brushed aside, and the military, and proponents of brute force, come to the fore. Compliance is more important than popularity – elections can be stage-managed
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no. 50 | december 2008 Revisiting t
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Revisiting the heart of darkness -
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Acknowledgements The larger part of
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Dennis Brutus, born 1924 in then Rh
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8 development dialogue december 200
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ehind most mass violence lurk econo
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ehind most mass violence lurk econo
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Is there a south perspective on gen
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is there a south perspective on gen
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The Voksenåsen Statement Genocides
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This Development Dialogue is publis
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