60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
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contextualising violence in colonial africa 67<br />
essence, all normative developmental designs discussed here, whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>tical or actual policy, implicated <strong>the</strong> state in particular mechanisms<br />
of what one could term <strong>the</strong> ‘outsourcing’ of control for <strong>the</strong><br />
sake of national economic management. Transitive control provided<br />
support for structural power. This could involve <strong>the</strong> quest to infl uence<br />
production, tariff s and duties, and access to particular raw materials<br />
for national currency; or <strong>the</strong> attempt to usher in a new global<br />
order, such as in Amery’s conceptions of an imperial world order or<br />
in Gini’s organicism. The eff ectiveness of control in terms of its function<br />
often connected closely to <strong>the</strong> choice of means. The threshold<br />
for <strong>the</strong> use of coercion and <strong>the</strong> acceptance of violence was arguably<br />
lower in colonies than within a defi ned national core polity. The interference<br />
in production methods, manipulation of tax and labour<br />
was not governed to <strong>the</strong> same extent by national politics, and <strong>the</strong> use<br />
of force, controversial as it was in some cases, was also of little political<br />
consequence, at least as long as war did not undermine <strong>the</strong> imperial<br />
state itself.<br />
The quest for extra-economic control did not necessarily lead to confrontation,<br />
though. Nei<strong>the</strong>r was control necessarily feasible. But it<br />
was not neutral ei<strong>the</strong>r. The frantic debates about <strong>the</strong> need for colonies<br />
in some countries, especially Italy, Portugal, Germany (and outside<br />
Europe, Japan), was stirred up under concrete global conditions and<br />
constraints to economic management (Rimmer 1979). The African<br />
grass could get trampled as a result of disputes between industrial and<br />
(re)industrialising states over means to protect structural power or to<br />
secure alternative control mechanism. Conversely, one could also argue<br />
that <strong>the</strong> relatively casual approach in British politics to colonial<br />
Africa in <strong>the</strong> interwar period, which stood in sharp contrast to <strong>the</strong><br />
late 1890s, was, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, due to <strong>the</strong> realisation that vast areas<br />
of <strong>the</strong> existing African empire were unfi t for a key economic support<br />
role and that in specifi c areas control could be enforced if needed.<br />
Historical constellations such as <strong>the</strong>se projected patterns of distinct,<br />
generative or isomorphic, incipient situations of confl ict onto colonial<br />
Africa. The relevant lineages cut across <strong>the</strong> habitual taxonomy<br />
of confl ict in textbooks of colonial Africa. To be sure, terms such as<br />
anti-colonial resistance, millenarian and messianic protest, rural and<br />
urban social protest action, colonial war, civil war, are all pertinent<br />
characterisations of confl ict. But studying <strong>the</strong> articulation of confl ict<br />
is not <strong>the</strong> same as fathoming its contextual dynamics. In disaggregating<br />
<strong>the</strong> dynamics of state agency from <strong>the</strong> specifi c perspective of national<br />
development, <strong>the</strong> aim here was to show how assumptions connected<br />
to lineages that were distinct and varied in context.