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60 years after the UN Convention - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

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212 development dialogue december 2008 – revisiting <strong>the</strong> heart of darkness<br />

against <strong>the</strong> settlers in 1896-7, and in particular at how <strong>the</strong> struggle<br />

was waged by ZANLA, <strong>the</strong> armed wing of ZANU. (Moore 1991; and<br />

Saul 1979). Like o<strong>the</strong>r Sou<strong>the</strong>rn African anti-colonial movements,<br />

ZANU in <strong>the</strong> 1970s was ‘hierarchical and authoritarian’. More than<br />

this, ‘opposition to established leadership and received <strong>the</strong>ory was<br />

regarded as both illegitimate and reactionary’ (Southall 2003: 259). 5<br />

Nor did anything much change <strong>after</strong> independence. Still ‘militaristic,<br />

vertical, undemocratic, violent and repressive’ (Freeman 2005:<br />

165), ZANU continued to conduct politics through <strong>the</strong> barrel of a<br />

gun. It may be, as one historian has argued, that it was ‘<strong>the</strong> heritage<br />

of guerrillaism [that] produced hierarchical, bureaucratic, and<br />

dictatorial tendencies ‘in post-independence governments (Legassick<br />

2002: 61), or, as ano<strong>the</strong>r has suggested, that aspects of <strong>the</strong> colonial<br />

system ‘reproduced <strong>the</strong>mselves in <strong>the</strong> struggle for its abolition and<br />

subsequently in <strong>the</strong> concepts of governance applied in post-colonial<br />

conditions’ (Melber 2003: 42), but <strong>the</strong> conclusion to be drawn from<br />

both accounts is that ‘singularly and collectively, <strong>the</strong> ruling elites of<br />

sou<strong>the</strong>rn Africa have demonstrated that <strong>the</strong>y are less interested in democracy<br />

than <strong>the</strong>y are in pursuing <strong>the</strong>ir self-interest and retention of<br />

power’ (Southall 2003: 268).<br />

The making and meanings of <strong>the</strong> massacres in Matabeleland would<br />

appear to be <strong>the</strong> fi rst but not <strong>the</strong> last legacy of <strong>the</strong> form of liberation<br />

struggle conceived and practised by ZANU-PF. Along <strong>the</strong> way,<br />

<strong>the</strong> democratic ideals and aspirations of ordinary men and women<br />

were ruthlessly subordinated to <strong>the</strong> logic of a commandist, intolerant<br />

movement whose post-independence policies readily embraced mass<br />

violence. That this violence was as regionally bounded as it was undiscriminating<br />

arguably brings it within <strong>the</strong> United Nations defi nition<br />

of genocide, which is <strong>the</strong> attempt to destroy ‘in whole or in part,<br />

a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group’ (as cited in Chirot and<br />

McCauley 2006: 11). But however <strong>the</strong> Gukurahundi atrocities are<br />

eventually defi ned, <strong>the</strong>y occurred in a very particular political and<br />

historical context. In April 2005, speaking at a rally to celebrate 25<br />

<strong>years</strong> of Independence, Mugabe reminded his audience that ‘it was<br />

<strong>the</strong> bullet that brought <strong>the</strong> ballot’ (Reuters, 8/4/2005). 6 He might have<br />

added that in Zimbabwe <strong>the</strong> bullet has always trumped <strong>the</strong> ballot.<br />

5 For <strong>the</strong> same point in a wider context see Phimister (2005).<br />

6 For a critical re-evaluation of elections in Zimbabwe since Independence see Kriger<br />

(2005).

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