38656356325923

continued. Lord Carrington, Thatcher’s appointee as Foreign Secretary, was determined
that a proper settlement should be achieved in Rhodesia once and for all. Since
Margaret Thatcher at that time was almost entirely ignorant of foreign affairs, she
listened to Peter Carrington – up to a point. She was not entirely convinced that
Muzorewa should not be given a chance and she had no sympathies either with black
nationalism or the sanctions policy against Rhodesia. The biennial Commonwealth
Heads of Government Conference was fixed for August in Lusaka at which the question
of a new settlement would be discussed. Unfortunately, in the meantime on a visit to
Canberra, she made a point of emphasizing publicly that she would not be able to push
economic sanctions against Rhodesia for that year through the House of Commons. ‘She
made some very silly remarks in Canberra which very nearly torpedoed the whole way
we were building up to this Conference,’ said a British official. All this, together with
what was known of her character and opinions, resulted in her demonization in the
press of the African Commonwealth countries who would be involved in the Conference,
notably Zambia, under the control of Dr Kenneth Kaunda. At this moment the Rhodesian
Government chose to bomb Lusaka, and the New Zealand Prime Minister, Robert
Muldoon, on a visit to London came forward with the unhelpful statement (designed for
his domestic right-wing electorate) that he might advise Elizabeth, as Queen of New
Zealand, not to go to Lusaka as it was in a war zone. The Commonwealth Secretary-
General, Sir Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal, stepped in and with Kaunda’s help persuaded
the nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo, unilaterally to declare a ceasefire during the
period when Elizabeth would be in Zambia. Ramphal was therefore able to defuse the
issue of her personal safety as a right-wing ploy to disrupt the Conference. ‘In my
conversations with the Queen,’ Sir Sonny said, ‘it was perfectly clear to me that whether
that issue had been removed or not, there was no way she was about to allow Muldoon
or anybody else to stop her.’ 15
Elizabeth was determined to use her unique position and contacts to save the Lusaka
Conference. In London she was in close touch with Sir Sonny Ramphal, who had the
right of access to her as head of the Commonwealth. When Commonwealth heads of
state came to London, even on private visits, she made time to see them. She had grown
up with the concept of the Commonwealth and, said Ramphal, was aware that
acceptance of her role as head of the Commonwealth in a post-imperial situation
depended on those countries’ perception of her as genuinely caring about them:
She did care and she did convey that caring. And I believe that this is the key to her unquestioned success in
the Commonwealth… there was a genuine measure of caring about the Commonwealth, about its people,
about its Governments, about its leaders, about its general situation, about its influence in the world. It
mattered to her, these were not formalities, this was an important side of her life… All that was understood
in the Commonwealth and in return there was this easy acceptance of the Queen as Head of the
Commonwealth.
Elizabeth never took sides publicly, unlike the Queen Mother, who, during the
Rhodesia years, would urge Foreign Ministers ‘not to be nasty to Smithy [Ian Smith]’.