World agriculture towards 2030/2050: the 2012 revision - Fao

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consumption grows faster than the aggregate in physical units, e.g. tonnes . For example,
China’s production of cereals grew from 1991-2007 at 0.4 percent p.a., that of meat at 4.9
percent. Both together in tonnage terms grew at 0.8 percent, but they grew at 2.4 percent when
aggregated on the basis of their prices – given that the price of meat is almost ten times that of
cereals in the price weights we use. Therefore, we should be aware that statements like “food
production grew at x percent or that growth exceeded that of population or that production must
increase by x percent in the future” do not necessarily imply that the quantities available for
consumption increase by x percent but that the aggregate value of production increases. Similar
considerations apply when food consumption quantities are aggregated with as weights their
calorie content or, alternatively, prices. For example, China’s food consumption per capita
measured by the price-based volume index doubled from 89/91-2005/07 but increased by only
16 percent in terms of calories. Analogous, though less pronounced, developments have
characterized food consumption changes in other countries. In contrast, in countries or regions
with little or virtually no diet diversification (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa), the volume of food
consumption has grown at roughly the same rates in both measures.
At world level, demand growth for crop and livestock products is projected to be lower
than in the past (Table 3.1), 1.1 percent p.a. in the period 2005/7-2050, half as large as in the
historical period. The difference is in part due to the lower population growth of the future
compared with the past (Table 2.3). This can be seen when the growth is expressed in terms
the demand per capita (middle section of Table 3.1). It is mainly the slowing-down growth of
demand in developing countries, and particularly in China, that accounts for a large part of the
global deceleration. Why this should be so is shown in the more detailed regional numbers of
Table 3.1. They show that the deceleration of the growth of demand per capita in the
developing countries outside China is much less pronounced (from 0.8-0.9 percent p.a. in the
past to 0.5 percent p.a. in the future – to 2050), an expected outcome given the operation of
the factors mentioned earlier. The zero population growth rate of the developed countries
from 2030-50 also contributes to the global slowdown of demand. The rather significant
population declines of the Russian Federation and Japan, will impact international trade flows
in commodities in which these countries are major importers, e.g. sugar and meat as indicated
later in this Chapter.
A better idea about the roles of the above-mentioned factors making for deceleration, in
particular the slowdown in the countries having attained higher consumption levels, can be
obtained from the data and projections presented in t in Table 3.1. Countries with high per
capita food consumption – over 2700 kcal/person/day – in 2005-07 face limited scope for
increasing consumption. Those with less than 2700 kcal, instead, show higher potential. For
the latter, very little decline in the growth rate of per capita consumption is expected: it is
projected at 0.6 percent p.a., vs. 0.7-0.8 percent in the past. In contrast, there is a drastic
decline in the growth rate of per capita consumption in the former group of countries. It is less
pronounced, but still present, if China is excluded from this group.
China’s role is pivotal in the deceleration of demand compared with the past. Its star
performance in increasing food consumption after the late 1970s meant that per capita
consumption of the aggregate of all developing countries grew from 1980-07 at 1.7 percent
p.a., but at only 0.8 percent if China is excluded. Such “China effect” disappears in the future
as the country has already reached 2970 kcal/person/day in 2005/07: there is much less scope
for further growth compared with the past when the country had started with 2175 kcal in
1979/81. Likewise, there is much less scope for diet diversification towards the higher-value
products (which increases the growth of the price weighted volume of consumption by more
than it increases calories – see Box 3.1) compared with the early 1980s when China’s food
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