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gupea_2077_29098_3

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SAF failed to control wage drift. Employers used wage drift to attract workers and<br />

were therefore unwilling to follow SAF’s recommendation in this specific matter.<br />

SAF did not make use of a wage drift control regulation, but recommended restrictions<br />

to their members. The main reason for this is that a strict regulation might have<br />

upset members, who would then have left SAF and acted as free riders. The cost of<br />

a regulation would have been too high in the long run; members leaving SAF would<br />

have undermined the bargaining power of the employers.<br />

SAF worked together with their members to impose regulations against “disloyal”<br />

recruitment practices, which worked out quite well. Disloyal recruitment<br />

was forbidden during most of the studied period. Unorganised employers, however,<br />

continued to employ disloyal recruitment practices.<br />

Women, elderly and disabled people<br />

Because of the unfulfilled demand for workers among employers a discussion arose<br />

concerning a more effective use of the labour force and the employment of women,<br />

elderly and disabled people in industrial production. The Social Democratic Labour<br />

Party (SAP) government and LO controlled the labour market policies together. A<br />

more effective employment of the labour force did not take place until the recession<br />

period 1957-1958. Only then did the state invest in reforms that stimulated mobility<br />

on the labour market. SAF complained about the lack of labour market reforms<br />

before 1957. When a more active labour market policy was implemented in the late<br />

1950s SAF was mildly satisfied. LO’s and SAF’s views concerning the labour market<br />

policies can to a large extent be explained by their will to control supply and demand<br />

on the labour market.<br />

In spite of preferring native “reserves” to the recruitment of foreign-born workers,<br />

LO acted as a cartel and tried to maintain the labour scarcity. LO did not support<br />

the introduction of these groups onto the labour market in a direct manner until<br />

the mid 1960s, precisely because they wanted to maintain the labour shortage. Surprisingly,<br />

SAF did not do much to mobilise the reserves either. Employers often saw<br />

the reserves as less then fully worthy employees and preferred therefore foreign male<br />

labour to women, elderly or disabled people.<br />

Labour migration<br />

As mentioned above Sweden as well as other Western European countries experienced<br />

a wave of labour migration after the Second World War. SAF and LO had<br />

rather different views on the use of foreign labour in the post war era. Since SAF<br />

wanted to increase the labour supply they advocated a liberal migration policy, while<br />

LO were more restrictive and tried to maintain the labour scarcity. LO’s long tradition<br />

of close relations and cooperation with the SAP government in power during<br />

the studied period made it possible to restrict the labour migration and thereby avoid<br />

labour surplus. LO had also great influence over the National Labour Market Board<br />

(AMS). AMS administrated work permits for immigrants and were involved in the<br />

recruitment of foreign-born workers (labour import).<br />

163

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