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1 Montgomery Modular Multiplication in Hard- ware

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FEI KEMT<br />

and effort needed for reproduction the output is lower. Mathematical analysis of<br />

TRNGs tries to f<strong>in</strong>d determ<strong>in</strong>istic dependencies <strong>in</strong>side the extraction method caus<strong>in</strong>g<br />

pseudo-randomness.<br />

As the parameters of TRNGs are highly dependent on the implementation, at-<br />

tack<strong>in</strong>g directly the hard<strong>ware</strong> realisation can be more powerful.<br />

Implementation attacks The second group, the implementation attacks, expects<br />

a direct physical access to an implementation and is based on weaknesses caused by<br />

implementation of the RNG. Implementation attacks are further divided to passive<br />

and active attacks.<br />

Passive attacks usually called side-channel attacks, benefit from a side channel <strong>in</strong>-<br />

formation ga<strong>in</strong>ed from the physical implementation. The power consumption,<br />

execution time or electromagnetic emanations can provide additional useful<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation about RNG <strong>in</strong>ternal status or processed data.<br />

Active attacks require an <strong>in</strong>volvement of the attacker <strong>in</strong>to changes of the standard<br />

work<strong>in</strong>g conditions, operation flow or design of the orig<strong>in</strong>al implementation of<br />

the RNG. The non-<strong>in</strong>vasive active attacks apply non-permanent changes of ex-<br />

ternal parameters for RNG e.g. supply voltage, temperature, with motivation<br />

to achieve non-standard - biased RNG output. With more resources one can<br />

execute an <strong>in</strong>vasive attack and change the physical structure of the implemen-<br />

tation. The attacker tries to destroy the source of randomness and make the<br />

output of the RNG constant or to get directly the output of generator.<br />

5.6 Conclusions<br />

In this chapter we have <strong>in</strong>troduced the topic of random numbers. The extraction<br />

of random bits <strong>in</strong> digital environment is a crucial topic <strong>in</strong> the area of system imple-<br />

mentations with public-key cryptography. The randomness itself and typical three<br />

sources of randomness: noise, metastability and jitter were described. In order to<br />

provide an overview on the actual status <strong>in</strong> the research we have collected descrip-<br />

tions of the recently published design proposals and implementations of TRNG.<br />

A typical design of TRNG implemented <strong>in</strong> a digital device <strong>in</strong>cludes a source<br />

of randomness from which a digitised noise signal can be harvested by a proper<br />

mechanism. We have expla<strong>in</strong>ed the importance of research <strong>in</strong> the areas of the<br />

harvest<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms and postprocess<strong>in</strong>g. The positive results of statistical tests<br />

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