2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
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Friday, April 4-10:00 am<br />
Paper<br />
Paper<br />
Paper<br />
Disc.<br />
Deep, Not Wide: William Howard Taft, Champion of<br />
Presidential Power<br />
As Chief Justice, Taft was expected to pare down the stewardship<br />
presidency of TR. Yet Taft, the seeming epitome of passive<br />
presidentialism, in fact becomes a vigorous and aggressive defender<br />
of executive power.<br />
Griffin C. Hathaway, Illinois Central College<br />
gchathaway@aol.com<br />
George Washington: Setting the Precedent for the Public<br />
Presidency<br />
George Washington's presidency set important precedents for the<br />
new executive. Public support was important for Washington's<br />
strategy during the Whiskey Rebellion, and demonstrates the<br />
structural nature of the public presidency.<br />
Kareb S. Hoffman, Wheeling Jesuit University<br />
khoffman@wju.edu<br />
Jimmy Carter and the Legislative Veto: Fighting Federal<br />
Comity Encroachment<br />
Carter’s implementation of report-and-wait interpretations, coupled<br />
with his formal message to Congress and the respectful defiance by<br />
his staff constituted a turning point in the legislative veto history<br />
and the legacy of the imperial presidency.<br />
Jason Friedman, Michigan State University<br />
jason.friedman@matrix.msu.edu<br />
Julia Azari, Marquette University<br />
julia.azari@marquette.edu<br />
Peter Schultz, Assumption College<br />
pschultz@assumption.edu<br />
40-4 DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS I: PORK AND DISTRICT<br />
CHARACTERISTICS<br />
Room UEH 403 on the 4th Floor, Fri at 10:00 am<br />
Chair Rene Lindstaedt, SUNY, Stony Brook<br />
rene.lindstaedt@stonybrook.edu<br />
Paper The Puzzling Geography of Federal Spending<br />
Standard theories of distributive politics do not explain why<br />
congressional districts receive different levels of federal government<br />
benefits. We examine the geography of federal spending to test old<br />
and new theories of distributive politics.<br />
Christopher R. Berry, University of Chicago<br />
crberry@uchicago.edu<br />
Barry C. Burden, University of Wisconsin<br />
bcburden@wisc.edu<br />
William G. Howell, University of Chicago<br />
whowell@uchicago.edu<br />
Paper The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Spending in<br />
Bicameral Legislatures<br />
We show, both formally and empirically, that bicameralism’s<br />
effect on the size of government is conditional on the geographical<br />
fragmentation of upper and lower chamber electoral districts.<br />
Jowei Chen, Stanford University<br />
jowei@stanford.edu<br />
Paper Pork Revealed: Distributive Politics in the Empire State<br />
In 2006 a New York State Court ordered the State Legislature to<br />
reveal names of legislators requesting add-ons to the budget. This<br />
presents a golden opportunity to re-examine pork barrel politics.<br />
This paper takes advantage of the opportunity.<br />
Kevin R. Hardwick, Canisius College<br />
hardwick@canisius.edu<br />
Paper The Distribution of Pork in the U.S. Senate<br />
We examine pork distribution in the U.S. Senate, investigating,<br />
among other issues, whether committee members procure more<br />
spending; whether procurements are related to seniority; and<br />
whether procurements are related to electoral vulnerability.<br />
Jeffrey Lazarus, Georgia State University<br />
jlazarus@gsu.edu<br />
Amy Steigerwalt, Georgia State University<br />
polals@langate.gsu.edu<br />
Disc.<br />
Rene Lindstaedt, SUNY, Stony Brook<br />
rene.lindstaedt@stonybrook.edu<br />
Richard Skinner, Allegheny College<br />
rskinner@allegheny.edu<br />
40-8 STRATEGIC CAREER CHOICES IN<br />
LEGISLATURES I<br />
Room Suite 11-150 on the 11th Floor, Fri at 10:00 am<br />
Chair Jesse T. Richman, Old Dominion University<br />
jrichman@odu.edu<br />
Paper Retirements and the Partisan Balance: MA House of<br />
Representatives, 1850-2005<br />
The paper examines the impact of disparate partisan retirement<br />
rates on the balance of power in the Massachusetts House of<br />
Representatives from 1850 to 2005.<br />
Adrian Ang, University of Missouri, Columbia<br />
auack5@mizzou.edu<br />
L. Marvin Overby, University of Missouri, Columbia<br />
overby@missouri.edu<br />
Paper Institutional Advancement in the U.S. House of Representatives<br />
We develop a measure of position value to test how parties evaluate<br />
members' commitment to the parties collective good and delegate<br />
power to those members.<br />
Eric Scott Heberlig, University of North Carolina, Charlotte<br />
esheberl@uncc.edu<br />
Bruce A. Larson, Gettysburg College<br />
blarson@gettysburg.edu<br />
Paper The Impact of Voluntary Retirement on the Institution of the<br />
Senate<br />
This paper will focus on how members retirement decisions have<br />
affected the U.S. Senate as an institution specifically including<br />
increase in partisan rancor, low public approval, roll call voting,<br />
committee work, and even the filibuster.<br />
Mary McHugh, Merrimack College<br />
mary.mchugh@merrimack.edu<br />
Paper Progressive Ambition, Constituency Serving and Legislative<br />
Performance in Argentina<br />
Federal systems involve multiple levels in political careers. Even<br />
though electoral institutions may not foster personal reputations,<br />
the structure of political careers can force legislators to use minor<br />
legislation to improve their political capital.<br />
Juan Pablo Micozzi, Rice University<br />
jmicozzi@rice.edu<br />
Disc. Jesse T. Richman, Old Dominion University<br />
jrichman@odu.edu<br />
Gregory Robinson, Binghamton University (SUNY)<br />
grobinso@binghamton.edu<br />
41-3 DISTRICT BEHAVIOR<br />
Room PDR 5 on the 3rd Floor, Fri at 10:00 am<br />
Chair Neil Malhotra, Stanford University<br />
neilm@stanford.edu<br />
Paper Promise and Performance in the U.S. Senate: Campaign Pledges<br />
and Accountability in Elections<br />
This paper proposes to examine the promises made by thirty-five<br />
successful Senate candidates across four elections (1998, 2000,<br />
2002, 2004) in an effort to understand why politicians fulfill some<br />
promises and not others.<br />
Kristin L. Campbell, University of Buffalo, SUNY<br />
kcampbel@buffalo.edu<br />
183