2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
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Thursday, April 3-2:45 pm<br />
4-6 BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN<br />
TRANSITION STATES<br />
Room PDR 16 on the 5th Floor, Thur at 2:45 pm<br />
Chair Adriana Buliga-Stoian, Binghamton University<br />
mbuliga1@binghamton.edu<br />
Paper <strong>Political</strong> Strategies to Manipulate Welfare Policy<br />
I show how the politics of welfare policy changed in Central/<br />
Eastern Europe and argue that the dismantling of the generous<br />
communist programs began before political change. Instead of<br />
hindering the change, democratization facilitated these changes.<br />
Christine Lipsmeyer, Texas A&M University<br />
lipsmeyer@tamu.edu<br />
Paper Determinants of Firm Behavior in Transition Economies<br />
Making and Playing by the Rules or Getting Around them: Are<br />
Business <strong>Association</strong>s Good Alternatives to Registration with<br />
Authorities in Dealing with Startup Problems and Contract<br />
Enforcement in Transition Economies<br />
Grigor Sukiassyan, California State University, Fullerton<br />
gsukiassyan@fullerton.edu<br />
Jeffrey B. Nugent, University of Southern California<br />
nugent@usc.edu<br />
Paper Market Reforms and An Endogenous Theory of Interest Group<br />
Formation<br />
Despite facing similar political and economic incentives, progress<br />
in market reforms in health and pensions vary widely in Russia. I<br />
develop an explanation of the endogenous causes of interest group<br />
organization and strength.<br />
Sarah E. Wilson Sokhey, Ohio State University<br />
sokhey.3@osu.edu<br />
Paper Talking Business: Using Parliamentary Debates to Measure the<br />
Influence of Business in New Market Economies<br />
This paper uses quantitative content analytic methods to analyze 17<br />
years of parliamentary debate in 3 new market economies. The goal<br />
is to explore the relationship between party competition the political<br />
influence of business.<br />
Roger Schoenman, University of California, Santa Cruz<br />
rschoenm@ucsc.edu<br />
Disc. Adriana Buliga-Stoian, Binghamton University<br />
mbuliga1@binghamton.edu<br />
5-5 EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS<br />
Room Suite 10-150 on the 10th Floor, Thur at 2:45 pm<br />
Chair Christopher J. Kam, University of British Columbia<br />
ckam@interchange.ubc.ca<br />
Paper The President in the Government Termination Process in<br />
European Democracies<br />
The paper investigates the influence of the president's power<br />
of parliament dissolution on the outcomes of the government<br />
termination process in European democracies, in which the survival<br />
of government depends on the confidence of parliament.<br />
Shin-Goo Kang, University of Rochester<br />
sgkg@troi.cc.rochester.edu<br />
Paper Government Arrangements, Policy Shocks and No-Confidence<br />
Motions<br />
I present a theory explaining the timing and presence of noconfidence<br />
motions as a signaling process between opposition<br />
parties, the government and key actors within the electorate.<br />
Laron K. Williams, Texas A&M University<br />
lwilliams@polisci.tamu.edu<br />
Paper<br />
Paper<br />
Disc.<br />
Making Rules For Rulemaking in Presidential and<br />
Parliamentary Systems<br />
We argue that APAs in parliamentary systems need not include ex<br />
ante constraints on administrative rulemaking. Conversely, APAs in<br />
presidential systems should devote significant attention to ex ante<br />
constraints on administrative rulemaking.<br />
Christian B. Jensen, University of Iowa<br />
Christian-Jensen@uiowa.edu<br />
Robert J. McGrath, University of Iowa<br />
robert-mcgrath@uiowa.edu<br />
The Role of European Parliaments in Choosing Officeholders<br />
Outside Cabinet<br />
Effective constraint by external officeholders depends on<br />
institutional powers and incentives to use them. I measure the<br />
incentive dimension for 5 external constraint institutions in<br />
25 European democracies and show both dimensions to be<br />
independent.<br />
Ulrich Sieberer, University Mannheim<br />
sieberer@uni-mannheim.de<br />
Christopher J. Kam, University of British Columbia<br />
ckam@interchange.ubc.ca<br />
5-21 INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL<br />
PERSPECTIVE<br />
Room UEH 401 on the 4th Floor, Thur at 2:45 pm<br />
Chair Julie Ann VanDusky, Binghamton University<br />
jvandus1@binghamton.edu<br />
Paper Ideas as Building Blocks of a Path<br />
Path dependence approach suffers from a materialist bias. Due to<br />
this bias, it neglects political continuities constituted by ‘ideas’. This<br />
study illustrates ideational path dependence as a distinct type of<br />
political continuity.<br />
Zeki Sarigil, Mugla University<br />
zesarigil@gmail.com<br />
Paper Strong Nobles and Weak States: Comparing the Rise and<br />
Demise of Prussia and Poland<br />
In this paper I use a comparative historical analysis and processtracing<br />
techniques to isolate and analyze the causal mechanisms<br />
that produced dramatically different outcomes among early-modern<br />
Brandenburg-Prussia and Poland.<br />
Nicholas C. Wheeler, University of Virginia<br />
ncw2e@virginia.edu<br />
Paper Globalization, Decentralization and Presidential Systems<br />
The paper argues that effect of globalization on fiscal<br />
decentralization is mediated by political competition. We estimate<br />
that effects of globalization on decentralization in presidential and<br />
parliamentary systems are statistically different.<br />
Mikhail Filippov, Binghamton University (SUNY)<br />
filippov@binghamton.edu<br />
Irina M. Busygina, MGIMO, Moscow<br />
irabus@mgimo.ru<br />
Paper Constitutional Choices: Types of Executives and Democratic<br />
Consolidation<br />
Using worldwide cross-sectional time series data, this study<br />
compares the consequences of the type of executive for democracy<br />
and stability. After presenting a new classification, the paper tests<br />
the potential consequences of each type.<br />
Pippa Norris, Harvard University<br />
Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu<br />
Disc. Julie Ann VanDusky, Binghamton University<br />
jvandus1@binghamton.edu<br />
Martin Gruberg, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh<br />
gruberg@uwosh.edu<br />
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