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2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

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Thursday, April 3-2:45 pm<br />

4-6 BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN<br />

TRANSITION STATES<br />

Room PDR 16 on the 5th Floor, Thur at 2:45 pm<br />

Chair Adriana Buliga-Stoian, Binghamton University<br />

mbuliga1@binghamton.edu<br />

Paper <strong>Political</strong> Strategies to Manipulate Welfare Policy<br />

I show how the politics of welfare policy changed in Central/<br />

Eastern Europe and argue that the dismantling of the generous<br />

communist programs began before political change. Instead of<br />

hindering the change, democratization facilitated these changes.<br />

Christine Lipsmeyer, Texas A&M University<br />

lipsmeyer@tamu.edu<br />

Paper Determinants of Firm Behavior in Transition Economies<br />

Making and Playing by the Rules or Getting Around them: Are<br />

Business <strong>Association</strong>s Good Alternatives to Registration with<br />

Authorities in Dealing with Startup Problems and Contract<br />

Enforcement in Transition Economies<br />

Grigor Sukiassyan, California State University, Fullerton<br />

gsukiassyan@fullerton.edu<br />

Jeffrey B. Nugent, University of Southern California<br />

nugent@usc.edu<br />

Paper Market Reforms and An Endogenous Theory of Interest Group<br />

Formation<br />

Despite facing similar political and economic incentives, progress<br />

in market reforms in health and pensions vary widely in Russia. I<br />

develop an explanation of the endogenous causes of interest group<br />

organization and strength.<br />

Sarah E. Wilson Sokhey, Ohio State University<br />

sokhey.3@osu.edu<br />

Paper Talking Business: Using Parliamentary Debates to Measure the<br />

Influence of Business in New Market Economies<br />

This paper uses quantitative content analytic methods to analyze 17<br />

years of parliamentary debate in 3 new market economies. The goal<br />

is to explore the relationship between party competition the political<br />

influence of business.<br />

Roger Schoenman, University of California, Santa Cruz<br />

rschoenm@ucsc.edu<br />

Disc. Adriana Buliga-Stoian, Binghamton University<br />

mbuliga1@binghamton.edu<br />

5-5 EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS<br />

Room Suite 10-150 on the 10th Floor, Thur at 2:45 pm<br />

Chair Christopher J. Kam, University of British Columbia<br />

ckam@interchange.ubc.ca<br />

Paper The President in the Government Termination Process in<br />

European Democracies<br />

The paper investigates the influence of the president's power<br />

of parliament dissolution on the outcomes of the government<br />

termination process in European democracies, in which the survival<br />

of government depends on the confidence of parliament.<br />

Shin-Goo Kang, University of Rochester<br />

sgkg@troi.cc.rochester.edu<br />

Paper Government Arrangements, Policy Shocks and No-Confidence<br />

Motions<br />

I present a theory explaining the timing and presence of noconfidence<br />

motions as a signaling process between opposition<br />

parties, the government and key actors within the electorate.<br />

Laron K. Williams, Texas A&M University<br />

lwilliams@polisci.tamu.edu<br />

Paper<br />

Paper<br />

Disc.<br />

Making Rules For Rulemaking in Presidential and<br />

Parliamentary Systems<br />

We argue that APAs in parliamentary systems need not include ex<br />

ante constraints on administrative rulemaking. Conversely, APAs in<br />

presidential systems should devote significant attention to ex ante<br />

constraints on administrative rulemaking.<br />

Christian B. Jensen, University of Iowa<br />

Christian-Jensen@uiowa.edu<br />

Robert J. McGrath, University of Iowa<br />

robert-mcgrath@uiowa.edu<br />

The Role of European Parliaments in Choosing Officeholders<br />

Outside Cabinet<br />

Effective constraint by external officeholders depends on<br />

institutional powers and incentives to use them. I measure the<br />

incentive dimension for 5 external constraint institutions in<br />

25 European democracies and show both dimensions to be<br />

independent.<br />

Ulrich Sieberer, University Mannheim<br />

sieberer@uni-mannheim.de<br />

Christopher J. Kam, University of British Columbia<br />

ckam@interchange.ubc.ca<br />

5-21 INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL<br />

PERSPECTIVE<br />

Room UEH 401 on the 4th Floor, Thur at 2:45 pm<br />

Chair Julie Ann VanDusky, Binghamton University<br />

jvandus1@binghamton.edu<br />

Paper Ideas as Building Blocks of a Path<br />

Path dependence approach suffers from a materialist bias. Due to<br />

this bias, it neglects political continuities constituted by ‘ideas’. This<br />

study illustrates ideational path dependence as a distinct type of<br />

political continuity.<br />

Zeki Sarigil, Mugla University<br />

zesarigil@gmail.com<br />

Paper Strong Nobles and Weak States: Comparing the Rise and<br />

Demise of Prussia and Poland<br />

In this paper I use a comparative historical analysis and processtracing<br />

techniques to isolate and analyze the causal mechanisms<br />

that produced dramatically different outcomes among early-modern<br />

Brandenburg-Prussia and Poland.<br />

Nicholas C. Wheeler, University of Virginia<br />

ncw2e@virginia.edu<br />

Paper Globalization, Decentralization and Presidential Systems<br />

The paper argues that effect of globalization on fiscal<br />

decentralization is mediated by political competition. We estimate<br />

that effects of globalization on decentralization in presidential and<br />

parliamentary systems are statistically different.<br />

Mikhail Filippov, Binghamton University (SUNY)<br />

filippov@binghamton.edu<br />

Irina M. Busygina, MGIMO, Moscow<br />

irabus@mgimo.ru<br />

Paper Constitutional Choices: Types of Executives and Democratic<br />

Consolidation<br />

Using worldwide cross-sectional time series data, this study<br />

compares the consequences of the type of executive for democracy<br />

and stability. After presenting a new classification, the paper tests<br />

the potential consequences of each type.<br />

Pippa Norris, Harvard University<br />

Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu<br />

Disc. Julie Ann VanDusky, Binghamton University<br />

jvandus1@binghamton.edu<br />

Martin Gruberg, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh<br />

gruberg@uwosh.edu<br />

123

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