2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Saturday, April 5-2:45 pm<br />
Paper<br />
Disc.<br />
Marx's Fetish in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology Freedom and<br />
Alienation<br />
A practical alternative to “anti-fetishist” social and political critique<br />
based on a phenomenology of thing relations that replaces detached<br />
critique with concrete intervention.<br />
Roberto Domingo Toledo, Stony Brook University<br />
rotoledo@gmail.com<br />
Ian Gordon Loadman, Arkansas State University<br />
iloadman@astate.edu<br />
35-14 LEGISLATIVE PARTIES<br />
Room UEH 407 on the 4th Floor, Sat at 2:45 pm<br />
Chair Tasos Kalandrakis, University of Rochester<br />
akalandr@mail.rochester.edu<br />
Paper <strong>Political</strong> Competition Under Proportional Representation<br />
We study political competition under proportional representation<br />
by developing a formal model that endogenizes party formation,<br />
elections and legislative policy-making.<br />
Seok-ju Cho, Yale University<br />
seok-ju.cho@yale.edu<br />
Insun Kang, Economist Intelligence Unit<br />
InsunKang@eiu.com<br />
Paper Endogenous Parties in an Assembly: Two Polarized Voting<br />
Blocs<br />
I show how members of an assembly of voters form voting blocs<br />
strategically to coordinate their votes in a repeated voting game. In<br />
a small assembly, I show that the equilibrium voting blocs must be<br />
two polarized parties.<br />
Jon X. Eguia, New York University<br />
eguia@nyu.edu<br />
Paper Coalition Formation in the German Federal States: A Synthesis<br />
of Policy and Office Motivation<br />
This paper extends coalition formation models which considers both<br />
office and policy motivations of parties. We introduce a method<br />
to estimate the grade of both motivations and apply it to data of<br />
German state-level coalition formations.<br />
Eric Linhart, University of Kiel<br />
elinhar@ae.uni-kiel.de<br />
Susumu Shikano, University of Mannheim<br />
shikanos@rumms.uni-mannheim.de<br />
Paper Big Parties, Dominant Parties, What's the Difference<br />
Dominant parties are common in multi party systems. They matter<br />
in terms of stability of coalitions and policies. The paper outlines<br />
theoretical conditions for the emergence of such parties and tests the<br />
theory on data from Russian and the Ukraine.<br />
Regina Smyth, Indiana University, Bloomington<br />
rsmyth@indiana.edu<br />
Itai Sened, Washington University in St. Louis<br />
sened@artsci.wustl.edu<br />
William Bianco, Indiana University, Bloomington<br />
wbianco@indiana.edu<br />
Christopher J. Kam, University of British Columbia<br />
ckam@interchange.ubc.ca<br />
Disc. Tasos Kalandrakis, University of Rochester<br />
akalandr@mail.rochester.edu<br />
Justin Fox, Yale University<br />
justin.fox@yale.edu<br />
36-14 INFERENCE AND MODEL SELECTION<br />
Room Salon 1 on the 3rd Floor, Sat at 2:45 pm<br />
Chair Kern Holger, Dartmouth College<br />
holger.kern@dartmouth.edu<br />
Paper The Causal (Mis)interpretation of Regression<br />
We present a nonparametric causal model that explicates the causal<br />
meaning of regression, demonstrates its insufficiency in typical<br />
cases, and provides a correction to current regression practice.<br />
Adam N. Glynn, Harvard University<br />
aglynn@iq.harvard.edu<br />
Kevin M. Quinn, Harvard University<br />
kquinn@fas.harvard.edu<br />
Paper Dissent Within the Ranks: Consistency of Choice in<br />
Nonparametric Multiple Comparisons<br />
In this paper, we consider the application of Arrow's Theorem to the<br />
nonparametric discrimination of statistical models. We explore the<br />
conditions under which the model ranks depend on the number of<br />
models being compared.<br />
Kevin A. Clarke, University of Rochester<br />
kevin.clarke@rochester.edu<br />
Mark Fey, University of Rochester<br />
mark.fey@rochester.edu<br />
Paper Semi-Exploratory Factor Analysis and Its Potential for the<br />
Social <strong>Science</strong>s<br />
Semi-exploratory factor analysis is a new estimator that lies on the<br />
continuum between exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis,<br />
largely captures the respective benefits of each, and avoids many of<br />
their downsides. My R package now implements it.<br />
Ben Goodrich, Harvard University<br />
goodrich@fas.harvard.edu<br />
Paper Some Conditions Required for Inference Based on One Hard<br />
Case<br />
This paper analyzes conditions under which one hard or unlikely<br />
case can be informative.<br />
Michael Herron, Dartmouth College<br />
herron@dartmouth.edu<br />
Disc. Delia Bailey, Washington University, St. Louis<br />
dbailey@wustl.edu<br />
38-13 INTEREST GROUP COALITIONS, REGULATION,<br />
AND POLICY<br />
Room Suite 8-254 on the 8th Floor, Sat at 2:45 pm<br />
Chair Maryann Barakso, American University<br />
barakso@american.edu<br />
Paper Interest Group Coalitions of the Parties: Legislative and<br />
Electoral Networks<br />
We analyze intra-party networks of interest group endorsements,<br />
contributions, and legislative support. We find that Democratic and<br />
Republican networks are divided along different dimensions and<br />
have distinct levels of centralization and density.<br />
Matt Grossmann, Michigan State University<br />
matt@mattg.org<br />
Casey Dominguez, University of San Diego<br />
caseydominguez@sandiego.edu<br />
Paper Diverse Coalitions and Social Welfare Policy in the United<br />
States<br />
This paper examines the relationship between interest group<br />
coalitions and influence in American legislatures, arguing that<br />
coalitions that are diverse with respect to group type are more likely<br />
to achieve legislative success on social policy issues.<br />
Robin Phinney, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor<br />
phinneyr@umich.edu<br />
297