2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
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Saturday, April 5-10:00 am<br />
Disc.<br />
John Bing, Heidelberg College<br />
jbing@heidelberg.edu<br />
Garrett Glasgow, University of California, Santa Barbara<br />
glasgow@polisci.ucsb.edu<br />
39-11 GAMING CONGRESS: AGENDA SETTING AND<br />
VETO BARGAINING<br />
Room UEH 403 on the 4th Floor, Sat at 10:00 am<br />
Chair Matthew G Jarvis, California State University, Fullerton<br />
mjarvis@fullerton.edu<br />
Paper President and Senate Majority Leader: Path-Dependent Theory<br />
of Partnership<br />
Using an array of data and methods, I find partnering between<br />
Presidents and Senate Majority Leaders, since the emergence of the<br />
office, in legislative agenda-setting and -pushing. These findings<br />
reinforce an individual perspective of the presidency.<br />
Andrea C. Hatcher, University of the South<br />
ahatcher@sewanee.edu<br />
Paper A Multinomial Logit Model of Presidential Agenda Setting in<br />
the U.S. House<br />
This paper models presidential agenda setting with a robust data<br />
set of over 3,500 U.S. House bills and a series of novel covariates.<br />
We find that agenda setting relies on proper timing, context, and the<br />
president's past agenda-setting efforts.<br />
William D. Anderson, University of South Daktoa<br />
William.Anderson@usd.edu<br />
Marcus Bevier, University of South Dakota<br />
Marcus.Bevier@usd.edu<br />
Reece Almond, University of South Dakota<br />
Reece.Almond@usd.edu<br />
Paper The Power of Saying No: The Effects of Veto Threats on<br />
Congressional Policy Making<br />
The empirical results illustrate the importance of veto threats both<br />
in terms of affecting policy change on specific legislation but also<br />
illustrating the significance of the president's negative power.<br />
Bryan W. Marshall, Miami University<br />
marshabw@muohio.edu<br />
Christopher S. Kelley, Miami University<br />
kelleycs@muohio.edu<br />
Paper I Am Not A Crook...But I Am a Vetoer: Nixon's Veto Threats<br />
Most scholars of veto threats focus on the ideological positioning<br />
of the president and Congress. Overlooked, however, are important<br />
factors such as a particular president's proclivity to veto and<br />
Congress' preferences over a law vs. an issue.<br />
Matthew G. Jarvis, California State University, Fullerton<br />
mjarvis@fullerton.edu<br />
Paper Who’s Blaming Whom<br />
This paper extends Groseclose and McCarty's theory of blame game<br />
veto politics to incorporate the fact that members of Congress and<br />
the president may have different audiences.<br />
Brad LeVeck, University of California, San Diego<br />
bleveck@ucsd.edu<br />
Disc. Matthew G Jarvis, California State University, Fullerton<br />
mjarvis@fullerton.edu<br />
40-1 EXAMINING CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND<br />
INSTITUTIONS ACROSS TIME<br />
Room PDR 18 on the 5th Floor, Sat at 10:00 am<br />
Chair John Baughman, Bates College<br />
jbaughma@bates.edu<br />
Paper Institutions and Aggregate Behavior in the Senate and House of<br />
Representatives<br />
We analyze the effects of institutional differences between the<br />
Senate and House on aggregate voting and coalition behavior in<br />
each chamber.<br />
Sean Gailmard, University of California, Berkeley<br />
gailmard@berkeley.edu<br />
Jeffrey A. Jenkins, University of Virginia<br />
jajenkins@virginia.edu<br />
Paper Congressional Performance and Incumbent Electoral<br />
Accountability<br />
We propose a theory of legislative organization that centers on the<br />
governing responsibilities of legislatures.<br />
E. Scott Adler, University of Colorado<br />
esadler@colorado.edu<br />
Michael J. Ensley, Indiana University<br />
ensley@indiana.edu<br />
John D. Wilkerson, University of Washington<br />
jwilker@u.washington.edu<br />
Paper The Rise and Decline of Turnout in Congressional Elections:<br />
Electoral Institutions, Competition, and Strategic Mobilization<br />
I examine the factors related to the rise and fall of turnout in<br />
congressional elections between 1870 and 1920.<br />
Erik J. Engstrom, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill<br />
eengstro@email.unc.edu<br />
Paper Constituency Congruency and Candidate Competition in U.S.<br />
House Elections<br />
We examine whether state legislators are more likely to run for<br />
a U.S. House seat if the degree of constituency congruency is<br />
relatively high between the state and congressional district.<br />
Jamie L. Carson, University of Georgia<br />
carson@uga.edu<br />
Michael H. Crespin, University of Georgia<br />
crespin@uga.edu<br />
Disc. John Wiggs Patty, Harvard University<br />
jpatty@gov.harvard.edu<br />
Nathan W. Monroe, University of the Pacific<br />
nmonroe@pacific.edu<br />
40-13 LEGISLATIVE RULES I: THE EFFECTS OF RULES<br />
Room Suite 10-150 on the 10th Floor, Sat at 10:00 am<br />
Chair Juan Javier Negri, University of Pittsburgh<br />
jjn7@pitt.edu<br />
Paper The Impact of the Electoral System on Legislative Behaviour in<br />
Switzerland<br />
This paper compares MPs’ behaviour in the two houses of the Swiss<br />
Parliament. It suggests that party discipline is stronger among MPs<br />
elected under PR, while those elected through a majoritarian system<br />
are more responsive to constituency preferences.<br />
Sarah Buetikofer, University of Zürich<br />
sarah.buetikofer@ipz.uzh.ch<br />
Paper A Decision-Making in the Korean National Assembly’s Standing<br />
Committee<br />
To analyze the working system of the standing committee on Health<br />
and Welfare in the Korean National Assembly.<br />
Hyun Jin Kim, Seoul National University<br />
hyunjinida@hotmail.com<br />
265
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