2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
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Thursday, April 3-4:45 pm<br />
Paper<br />
Paper<br />
Paper<br />
Disc.<br />
Why is Seniority Beneficial to Legislators The Case of the U.S.<br />
House<br />
I test competing explanations for the power of senior House<br />
members: (1) seniority is excludable and senior members trade<br />
information for influence, (2) seniority is a non-excludable positive<br />
externality with associational benefits for others.<br />
Andrew J. Taylor, North Carolina State University<br />
andrew_taylor@ncsu.edu<br />
Deciding to Quit: A Duration Model of Retirement in Congress<br />
This paper examines existing theories on the correlates of<br />
Congressional retirement, specifically Theriault's theory of career<br />
ceilings, from both the House and Senate using an original dataset<br />
and a Cox Proportional model of duration.<br />
Joseph Sempolinski, Yale University<br />
joseph.sempolinski@yale.edu<br />
Ambition and Party Loyalty in the U.S. Senate<br />
This paper analyzes the effect ambition for higher office has on<br />
party loyalty and party cohesion in the U.S. Senate. Findings<br />
indicate that ambition and a need to appeal to primary voters<br />
influences party loyalty in the upper chamber.<br />
Sarah Ann Treul, University of Minnesota<br />
streul@umn.edu<br />
Antoine Yoshinaka, University of California, Riverside<br />
antoine@ucr.edu<br />
Andrew J. Taylor, North Carolina State University<br />
andrew_taylor@ncsu.edu<br />
Juan Pablo Micozzi, Rice University<br />
jmicozzi@rice.edu<br />
41-101 ROUNDTABLE ON POLITICAL AMBITION: THE<br />
CITIZEN POLITICAL AMBITION STUDY , WAVE 2<br />
Room Crystal on the 3rd Floor, Thur at 4:45 pm<br />
Chair Jennifer L. Lawless, Brown University<br />
jennifer_lawless@brown.edu<br />
We will present key results from the second wave of the Citizen<br />
<strong>Political</strong> Ambition Study. Panelists will then comment on our<br />
findings and discuss more broadly the study of political ambition as<br />
it relates to their particular areas of interest.<br />
Panelist Richard L. Fox, Loyola Marymount University<br />
richard.fox@lmu.edu<br />
David W. Brady, Stanford University<br />
dbrady@stanford.edu<br />
Jack Citrin, University of California, Berkeley<br />
gojack@berkeley.edu<br />
Kathleen Dolan, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee<br />
kdolan@uwm.edu<br />
Sue Tolleson-Rinehart, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill<br />
suetr@unc.edu<br />
42-6 SEPARATION OF POWERS<br />
Room Salon 12 on the 3rd Floor, Thur at 4:45 pm<br />
Chair Brett Curry, Georgia Southern University<br />
bcurry@georgiasouthern.edu<br />
Paper Impeachment: Leash or Euthanizer<br />
This paper will examine whether the impeachment process requires<br />
that officials be removed from office upon conviction or whether<br />
lesser penalties may be imposed as well.<br />
Peter Schultz, Assumption College<br />
pschultz@assumption.edu<br />
Paper Using Adjudication to Achieve Administrative Goals of the<br />
Federal Judiciary<br />
Did a hidden agenda undergird the celebrated federalism revolution<br />
wrought by the Rehnquist Court Did the Court through its<br />
adjudication achieve administrative goals of the federal judiciary set<br />
by the Judicial <strong>Conference</strong> of the United States<br />
John W. Winkle, University of Mississippi<br />
jww@olemiss.edu<br />
Paper Pigford and the Power of Joint Judicial, Congressional and<br />
Executive Action<br />
This paper examines how the three branches of government interact<br />
with each other and respond to their respective spheres of power in<br />
addressing a civil rights violation by a governmental entity through<br />
an in-depth analysis of Pigford vs. Glickman.<br />
Demelza Anne Baer, Tulane University<br />
demelzabaer@hotmail.com<br />
Paper The Origins of an Independent Judiciary in Virginia, 1606-1776<br />
Virginia was the only state to have an independent judiciary in the<br />
federal conception of the institution prior to the U.S. Constitution<br />
of 1787. My paper traces the origins of the judicial institution in<br />
Virginia.<br />
Scott D. Gerber, Ohio Northern University<br />
s-gerber@onu.edu<br />
Disc. Brett Curry, Georgia Southern University<br />
bcurry@georgiasouthern.edu<br />
42-25 THE STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF CONSENSUS AND<br />
STRUGGLE<br />
Room PDR 4 on the 3rd Floor, Thur at 4:45 pm<br />
Chair Brandon L. Bartels, Stony Brook University<br />
brandon.bartels@stonybrook.edu<br />
Paper On Contingents, Pivots and Fluidity: Macro Level Analyses of<br />
Certiorari<br />
To win on the merits at least five of the justices need to join hands.<br />
To select a case at least four of them are necessary. In this piece I<br />
study the macro-level patterns that determine upshots as well as<br />
configure the decision-making environment.<br />
Udi Sommer, University at Albany, SUNY<br />
esommer@albany.edu<br />
Paper The Acclimation Effect Revisited<br />
This paper improves upon existing research by building a theory<br />
for why we expect acclimation effects, models acclimation as an<br />
ongoing process, and employs a heteroskedastic probit model to<br />
evaluate the consistency of judicial choice.<br />
Raymond V. Carman, Jr., Binghamton University<br />
raymond.carman@binghamton.edu<br />
Paper Dissent and Legal Development in Collegial Courts<br />
This paper presents a formal model of dissenting behavior in<br />
collegial courts. I argue that dissents are written to influence future<br />
development of the law. Future legal change becomes more likely<br />
through the authorship of "high quality" dissents.<br />
Susan Navarro Smelcer, Emory University<br />
sknavar@emory.edu<br />
Paper Are Court Opinions Really at the Median of the Majority<br />
Coalition<br />
A claim has been made that majority opinions on the Supreme Court<br />
are located at the median of the majority coalition (the MMC). The<br />
claim has major logical problems; in fact, an opinion at the MMC<br />
may not even be able to attract majority support.<br />
Thomas H. Hammond, Michigan State University<br />
thammond@msu.edu<br />
Disc. Brandon L. Bartels, Stony Brook University<br />
brandon.bartels@stonybrook.edu<br />
152