2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Saturday, April 5-2:45 pm
Paper
Paper
Paper
Disc.
How Regulation Shapes Interest Groups: An Empirical Analysis
of the NRA
This research on NRA argues that the stronger the government
regulations become, the stronger the interest groups become,
through periods divided into as pre-1934 period, inter 1934-1968
period, inter 1968-1994 period, and post 1994 period.
Yejin Oh, Ewha Womans University
caesar5th@gmail.com
Reinforcing Inequalities: The Perverse Consequences of a
Strong Interest Group Sector
We find that communities with stronger interest group sectors
received more federal grants than those with weaker associational
systems. This is important because we also find that groups are less
common in areas that appear to need them more.
Maryann Barakso, American University
barakso@american.edu
Jessica Colleen Gerrity, Washington College
jgerrity2@washcoll.edu
Media Framing of Interest Groups as Special Interests in Social
Security Reform
Media frames color how recipients view policies, events, and actors.
This paper examines the common portrayal of interest groups by
newspaper reporters as “special interests” in addition to other, more
general, frames.
Richard Almeida, Francis Marion University
ralmeida@fmarion.edu
Suzanne M. Robbins, George Mason University
srobbin1@gmu.edu
39-13 PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL POLICY-
MAKING II
Room Suite 12-150 on the 12th Floor, Sat at 2:45 pm
Chair William D. Anderson, University of South Dakota
William.Anderson@usd.edu
Paper Leading Without Followers: Influence of Presidential Rhetoric
on Congress
This study provides an alternative context to test the "going public"
strategy of presidential rhetoric (Kernell 1997) to reveal whether the
element of public support is vital or if the president’s rhetoric on its
own can gain legislative influence.
Tiffany Harper, University of Arizona
tharper@email.arizona.edu
Paper Looking for Love: The Evolution of Presidential Negotiation
with Congress
To which members does a president first look when attempting
to negotiate votes on a bill I seek to pinpoint the evolution of
presidential negotiation with members and characteristics causing
variation among presidents in whom they contact and when.
Meredith Barthelemy, Duke University
mlb38@duke.edu
Paper Just A Resolution: Presidential Influence On House Rules
Committee Resolutions
Focusing on Presidential Statements of Administration Policy
from the 105th through the 108th Congresses, I examine what, if
any, influence the President's position on a prospective piece of
legislation has on the rules under which it is considered.
Stonegarden Grindlife, University of California, Los Angeles
sgrindlife@ucla.edu
Paper Silence Is Sometimes Gold President's Strategic Position
Taking in Congress
This paper argues a president strategically hides his position in
order to derive a better legislative outcome and to avoid party
polarization. A spatial model derives hypotheses that will be tested
by using a whole vote record of several sessions.
Shunta Matsumoto, Meijo University
smatsumo@ccmfs.meijo-u.ac.jp
Paper
Disc.
Presidential-Bureaucratic Management and Policy-Making
Success in Congress
This study explores how agency input (i.e. expertise) and signaling
influence presidential policymaking. I find that decentralized
strategies that use agency input and presidential signaling lead to
increased presidential policy success in Congress.
José D. Villalobos, Texas A&M University
jvillalobos@polisci.tamu.edu
Kenneth W. Moffett, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville
kmoffett@siue.edu
William D. Anderson, University of South Dakota
William.Anderson@usd.edu
40-14 THE US SENATE
Room PDR 18 on the 5th Floor, Sat at 2:45 pm
Chair Sean M. Theriault, University of Texas, Austin
seant@mail.utexas.edu
Paper The Fate of Amendments in the U.S. Senate
The amendment process plays a prominent role in decision-making
in the U.S. Senate. We examine factors that affect the chambers
disposition of amendments, in order to understand which actors
most successfully use amendments to affect policy.
Chris Den Hartog, California Poly Technical Institute
cdenhart@calpoly.edu
Nathan W. Monroe, University of the Pacific
nmonroe@pacific.edu
Paper Why do Senators Vote Against Majority Rule in the Senate
Why do senators vote against majority rule in the Senate This
paper explains senators' preferences toward cloture rule reform from
1949 to 1975. We use scaling methods to analyze a unique dataset
of senators' choices related to cloture reform.
Gregory Koger, University of Miami
gkoger@miami.edu
Hans Noel, Georgetown University
hcn4@georgetown.edu
Paper Partisan Dimensions of Indirect Senate Elections, 1871-1913
This paper looks at roll call votes in state legislatures to elect U.S.
Senators from 1871-1913. We measure the cohesiveness of majority
and minority party legislators' votes for specific candidates across
extended ballot elections.
Wendy J. Schiller, Brown University
Wendy_Schiller@Brown.edu
Charles Stewart III, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
cstewart@mit.edu
Paper Negative Agenda Power in the U.S. Senate
This paper challenges the traditional view of the U.S. Senate as
a legislative body without marked agenda setting control by the
majority party; its influence on the Senate is indeed strong, although
not as much as in the House of Representatives.
Everardo Rodrigo Diaz Gomez, University of California, Santa
Barbara
everardo@umail.ucsb.edu
Disc. Sean M. Theriault, University of Texas, Austin
seant@mail.utexas.edu
Lauren C. Bell, Randolph-Macon College
lbell@rmc.edu
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