2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Friday, April 4-8:00 am
34-6 THE CITIZEN AND THE WORLD: THEORIZING
CONNECTIONS
Room PDR 16 on the 5th Floor, Fri at 8:00 am
Chair Leonard "Rick" Sorenson, Assumption College
genierick@aol.com
Paper Rousseau's Thoughts on Liberal Cosmopolitanism
This paper examines Rousseau's criticisms of cosmoplitan society as
discussed in his novel Julie ou La Nouvelle Heloise. His criticisms
are made from the perspective of virtue and happiness as understood
by the citizen, the lover and the philosopher.
Mark Kremer, Kennesaw State University
mkremer@kennesaw.edu
Paper Political Realism East and West: A Comparative Analysis of
Political Thought of Masao Maruyama and Isaiah Berlin
Is political realism the same between in the West and in the East
I will answer this question by analyzing the political realism of
Masao Maruyama, a japanese thinker and that of Isaiah Berlin. The
analysis will indicate the fundamental difference.
Fumiko Sasaki, St. Edwards University
fumikosasaki@aol.com
Paper A Post-Colonial Future: Ethical Possibilities
I argue that Post-Colonial studies suffers from two primary pitfalls:
a reification of the East/West dualism and an overemphasis on
historical and literary criticism. I offer an alternative and explicit
Post-Colonial ethic.
Jennifer P. Forshee, University of Florida
jennf123@ufl.edu
Paper Subjectivity in Crisis: Camus and Levinas on Exile and
Hospitality
This essay inquires into the commonalities, differences and
implications of Camus and Levinas on exile and hospitality and
explores the extent to which their highly subjectivist politics may
not be sufficient for political action in the modern world.
N. Susan Gaines, Louisiana State University
nsgaines@hotmail.com
Disc. Leonard "Rick" Sorenson, Assumption College
genierick@aol.com
35-6 INFORMATION AND BUREAUCRATIC
DISCRETION
Room PDR 17 on the 5th Floor, Fri at 8:00 am
Chair Sanford C. Gordon, New York University
sanford.gordon@nyu.edu
Paper Information, Accountability and the Politics of Investigations
We develop a game-theoretic model that identifies the conditions
under which a political executive such as a president can exert
control over a political appointee who unilaterally decides whether
to investigate possible legal violations.
Kenneth W. Shotts, Stanford University
kshotts@stanford.edu
Alan E. Wiseman, Ohio State University
wiseman.69@osu.edu
Paper Top-Down Bias: The Politics of Information Gathering
Information gathered by executive agencies is frequently used to
priotize different potential tasks. Strategic policy-interested advisors
should gather information in accord with the final decision-maker's
biases and preferences.
John Wiggs Patty, Harvard University
jpatty@gov.harvard.edu
Paper The Special Interest Politics of Bureaucratic Discretion
We derive special interests' preferences over bureaucratic discretion
from a model of interest group competition at the agency level.
We then use these induced preferences to study interest group
competition over discretion at the legislative level.
Stuart V. Jordan, University of Rochester
sjordan@mail.rochester.edu
Adam Meirowitz, Princeton University
ameirowi@princeton.edu
Paper
Disc.
The Declining Talent Pool of Government
Government success requires high performance by talented
ministers. To provide incentives, a leader fires those who fail. We
model ministerial turnover with a finite talent-pool, analyse the
optimal firing rule and its consequences for performance.
Torun Dewan, London School of Economics
t.dewan@lse.ac.uk
David P. Myatt, Oxford University
david.myatt@economics.ox.ac.uk
Sanford C. Gordon, New York University
sanford.gordon@nyu.edu
Catherine Hafer, New York University
cih1@nyu.edu
36-9 MODELS FOR SEQUENTIAL EVENTS AND
DURATION
Room Wabash on the 3rd Floor, Fri at 8:00 am
Chair Curtis Signorino, University of Rochester
sign@mail.rochester.edu
Paper Estimating a Strategic Duration Model of Government
Formation and Survival
We developed a method for estimating the effects of variables on
the duration of bargaining processes and survival of bargained
outcomes when both are jointly determined. We use our method to
analyze the duration of government formation and survival.
Jude C. Hays, University of Illinois
jchays@uiuc.edu
Aya Kachi, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
akachi2@uiuc.edu
Paper
Paper
Paper
Disc.
Modeling the Government Formation Process
We develop an empirical approach to model the sequential nature of
the government formation process and solve some methodological
problems present in past work, and then test hypotheses on the
government formation process using a new data set.
Garrett Glasgow, University of California, Santa Barbara
glasgow@polsci.ucsb.edu
Matt Golder, Florida State University
mgolder@fsu.edu
Sona N. Golder, Florida State University
sgolder@fsu.edu
Multi-level Frailty Models and the Onset of Civil War
We examine the role of heterogeneity and event dependence in risk
for civil war (re)currence.
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Ohio State University
jboxstef+@osu.edu
Suzanna L. De Boef, Pennsylvania State University
sdeboef@psu.edu
Kyle Joyce, Pennsylvania State University
kjoyce@psu.edu
Kevin Sweeney, Joint Warfare Analysis Center
ksweeney@jwac.mil
Some Models for Ordinal and Sequential Events Data
This paper considers models for events data that are ordinal and/or
sequential.
Bradford Jones, University of California, Davis
bsjjones@ucdavis.edu
Alex Mayer, University of California, Davis
akmayer@ucdavis.edu
Matthew Lebo, Stonybrook University
mlebo@notes.sunysb.edu
166