2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Thursday, April 3-10:00 am
17-2 ALLIANCE AND COALITION POLITICS
Room PDR 4 on the 3rd Floor, Thur at 10:00 am
Chair Renato Corbetta, University of Alabama, Birmingham
corbetta@uab.edu
Paper Testing Alternative Models of Bilateral and Multilateral
Alliance Formation
This paper examines how threats, capabilities, power status, and
political similarity relate to bilateral and multilateral alliance
formation.
Volker Krause, Eastern Michigan University
vkrause@emich.edu
Paper Staying in the Fight: Political Determinants of Troop
Withdrawals from Iraq
This paper seeks to explain why states withdraw their troops from
the coalition effort to stabilize Iraq. Among other variables we
explore the effect of casualties, the enemy’s willingness to suffer,
and regime type on the decision to withdraw.
Daniel S. Morey, University of Kentucky
daniel-morey@uky.edu
Chaise Camp, University of Kentucky
chaise.camp@uky.edu
Jamil Sewell, University of Kentucky
jasewe2@uky.edu
Paper Stationing Forces in an Alliance: Overcoming the Security
Dilemma in the Context of Global Grand Strategy
A way to assure allies of credible support is through placing military
bases in their territory; yet this is not universally done. This paper
models the decision to deploy foreign bases to maintain security ties
in the context of regional concerns.
Michael A. Allen, Binghamton University
michael.allen@binghamton.edu
Paper Bandwagoning vs. Balancing Alliances in Regional Security
Systems
While most theories speak to the bandwagon vs. balance debate
few empirical studies use a large N statistical approach. This paper
uses regional security systems to provide a more rigorous test at the
appropriate level of analysis.
Amanda A. Licht, University of Iowa
amanda-licht@uiowa.edu
Disc. Renato Corbetta, University of Alabama, Birmingham
corbetta@uab.edu
17-26 FORMAL MODELING AND CONFLICT (Cosponsored
with Formal Modeling, see 35-19)
Room Wabash on the 3rd Floor, Thur at 10:00 am
Chair Kristopher William Ramsay, Princeton University
kramsay@princeton.edu
Paper How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games
The cooperative outcomes in games like Prisoners’ Dilemma,
Chicken, and certain n-person games can be stabilized by
transforming them into voting games. Such games are illustrated by
a Bible story and an n-person public-goods game.
Steve Brams, New York University
steven.brams@nyu.edu
Marc Kilgour, Wilfrid Laurier University
mkilgour@wlu.ca
Paper Cycling Out of the Rebels Dilemma: Collective Action Paradox
and Reported Games
By making the dynamism of repeated interaction endogenous to the
PD model at the heart of the Rebels Dilemma, Theory of Moves
allows for a more straightforward and parsimonious inclusion of
externalities in determining non-rational collective action.
Jason Koslowe, Georgetown University
jsk35@georgetown.edu
Paper
Disc.
Model(s) of Stability
The aim of the paper is to develop a conceptual model of stability.
Gnana K. Bharathy, University of Pennsylvania
bharathy@seas.upenn.edu
G. Jiyun Kim, University of Pennsylvania
jiyunkim@seas.upenn.edu
Barry G. Silverman, University of Pennsylvania
basil@seas.upenn.edu
Kristopher William Ramsay, Princeton University
kramsay@princeton.edu
18-1 POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID
Room UEH 406 on the 4th Floor, Thur at 10:00 am
Chair Joonui Park, Boston University
junepark@bu.edu
Paper The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation
The current study examines the impact of September 11 on U.S.
foreign aid allocation. The paper argues that following 9/11 security
concerns will dominate the allocation of foreign aid. The statistical
analysis supports this expectation.
Justin Clardie, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
jclardie@uwm.edu
Paper
Paper
Disc.
U.S. Foreign Aid to the Middle East: Do Human Right Practices
Matter
This is a quantitative study based on an annual cross-section data of
a selected number of Middle Eastern countries from 1980-2005. The
authors examine U.S. foreign aid practices in the period 1980-2005
to a selected number of Middle Easten countries
Basel Saleh, Radford University
bsaleh@radford.edu
Nozar Hashemzadeh, Radford University
Nhashemz@radfrod.edu
The Foreign Economic Assistant from USAID to the Peace
Corps: 1972 - 2005
The purpose of this study is to determine why the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) has given
economic assistance to the Peace Corps for the years 1972 to 2005.
Donald David Arthur Schaefer, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh
don7@myuw.net
Joonui Park, Boston University
junepark@bu.edu
19-2 COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS
Room PDR 6 on the 3rd Floor, Thur at 10:00 am
Chair Jana von Stein, University of Michigan
janavs@umich.edu
Paper Politics of Compliance with International Humanitarian Law
This paper provides systematic evidence about the compliance
behavior with regard to international humanitarian law and
explains the observed diversity of functions and roles performed by
international humanitarian organizations.
Hyeran Jo, Texas A&M University
hyeranjo@politics.tamu.edu
Catarina Thomson, Texas A&M University
catarinathomson@yahoo.com
Paper Compliance and Regional Trade Institutions
This paper explains the diversity of institutional arrangements
governing regional trade integration as a response to the problem
of compliance. It tests hypotheses from two theoretical approaches
using a new data set of agreements.
Douglas M. Stinnett, University of Georgia
stinnett@uga.edu
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