2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Friday, April 4-2:45 pm
Paper
Disc.
International Aid and Civil War in Poor Countries: The Role of
Uncertainty
Uncertainty about international aid causes governments in
developing countries to make inefficient redistributive choices,
leading to civil war. Evidence comes from a unified formal and
statistical analysis of African countries from 1966 to 2005.
Martin C. Steinwand, University of Rochester
martin.steinwand@rochester.edu
Dan Reiter, Ohio University
perla@ohio.edu
16-8 THE LAWS OF WAR
Room Salon 2 on the 3rd Floor, Fri at 2:45 pm
Chair Brian John Gorman, Towson University
bgorman@towson.edu
Paper Declaring War and Peace
Why does the U.S. no longer declare war or conclude peace
treaties This paper argues that, as the law of war has proliferated,
the U.S. has sought to create ambiguity as to whether that law
applies to it by declining to engage in the formalities of war.
Tanisha M. Fazal, Columbia University
tmf2001@columbia.edu
Paper Just War Theory and the (Re)Privatization of Force
This paper looks at the reintroduction of private actors in the area of
security and considers the implications for just war theory, which is
premised on a statist view of the international system.
Amy E. Eckert, Metropolitan State College, Denver
aeckert@gmail.com
Paper The Practice of Pre-emptive and Preventive Wars: What is the
Custom
How often do states engage in pre-emptive and preventive war By
using databases that cover the seventy-nine major interstate wars
from 1816 to 1997, I find that states engage in pre-emptive and
preventive wars between 19 and 33 percent of the time.
Dan Lindley, University of Notre Dame
dlindley@nd.edu
Paper The Morality of Acquiring Nuclear Weapons in the Second
Nuclear Age
The NPT obliges non-nuclear weapons states from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Only a “fundamental change in circumstances”
overrides this obligation. I argue the NPT's integrity has been
undermined, permitting NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons.
Thomas Earl Doyle, University of California, Irvine
tdoyle@uci.edu
Disc. Brian John Gorman, Towson University
bgorman@towson.edu
17-10 DEMOCRACY, REGIME INSTITUTIONS, AND
CONFLICT
Room UEH 411 on the 4th Floor, Fri at 2:45 pm
Chair Scott Bennett, Pennsylvania State University
sbennett@psu.edu
Paper Constraint vs. Control: Variations in Autocracies and Casualties
This paper examines the link between variations in autocracies and
casualties by testing a set of competing hypotheses, which are based
on executive constraints versus societal control and are derived from
two opposing typologies of authoritarianism.
Cigdem V. Sirin, Texas A&M University
cigdemsirin@politics.tamu.edu
Michael T. Koch, Texas A&M University
mtkoch@politics.tamu.edu
Paper
Paper
Paper
Paper
Disc.
Institutional Similarity and Conflict Initiation: A Theory of
Dyadic Peace
Are the dyadic democratic and dictatorial peace theories distinct,
or are they better explained by a single theory of institutional
similarity This paper suggests the sharing of similar domestic
institutions causes peace regardless of regime type.
Curtis M. Bell, University of Colorado
curtis.bell@colorado.edu
Where's Waldo: The Search for the Elusive Relationship
Between Polulation Growth and Conflict
Our aim is to better understand the effect of population growth on
conflict. We examine the propensity of states to be in international
conflict conditioned on four primary explanatory variables:
population, regime, power and energy consumption.
Randolph Siverson, University of California, Davis
rmsiverson@ucdavis.edu
Sklyer J. Cranmer, Harvard University
scranmer@iq.harvard.edu
Leadership Succession and Replacement Mechanisms and
Conflict Initiation
In both democratic and non-democratic states, constitutional
leadership replacement and succession mechanisms can shape
leaders’ incentive structures such that they do not get involved in
conflicts that are costly to the regime’s survival.
Ozlem Elgun, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
oelgun2@unl.edu
Modeling the Paths to Peace: Democracy, Distance, and
Dangerous Dyads
How can we model the effects of democracy and political
irrelevance on conflict Both are in principle sufficient, or nearly
so, for peace; but garden-variety additive models fail to capture this
relationship. This paper offers an alternative.
Bear F. Braumoeller, Ohio State University
braumoeller.1@polisci.osu.edu
Brett Benson, Vanderbilt University
brett.benson@vanderbilt.edu
17-19 INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION INTO CIVIL
WARS
Room UEH 400 on the 4th Floor, Fri at 2:45 pm
Chair Timothy Allen Carter, Wayne State University
tcarter@wayne.edu
Paper Occupational Hazards: The U.S. Record in Military
Occupations, 1945-Present
American military occupations since 1945 have generally succeeded
in their objectives, but there have been some spectacular failures.
The paper shows the precense or absence of armed opposition to be
a crucial factor in occupation outcomes.
Michael J. Engelhardt, Luther College
engelhmi@luther.edu
Paper
Paper
Ethnicity, Institutional Constraints and the Scope of
Intervention
Carment and James have developed a model to examine the
influence of domestic factors on decisions to intervene in ethnic and
civil conflicts. The current paper empirically tests this model and
the results offer qualified support for the model.
Justin Clardie, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
jclardie@uwm.edu
Explaining Mass Killing in Darfur
I explain why rebels in Darfur resorted to violence, why the
Sudanese government responded by using ethnic cleansing and
mass killing, and why the rebels and the government have chosen to
escalate violence rather than negotiate a durable settlement.
Patrick Johnston, Northwestern University
johnston@northwestern.edu
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