2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Thursday, April 3-4:45 pm
17-5 UNDERSTANDING THE USE AND EFFECT OF
COERCION
Room UEH 400 on the 4th Floor, Thur at 4:45 pm
Chair Mark Souva, Florida State University
msouva@fsu.edu
Paper What's in Your Toolbox
When and how will the United States intervene to bring
international crises to an end In this paper, we use a competing
risks hazard model to explore when the United States will utilize
particular coercive tools.
Susan Hannah Allen, Texas Tech University
susan.allen@ttu.edu
Mia R. Hall, Texas Tech University
mia.r.hall@ttu.edu
Paper A Strategic Model of Economic Coercion in the Shadow of
Military Force
I estimate a strategic model of economic coercion that allows states
to militarize their dispute. The results based on about 500 cases
reveal a non-linear relationship between the sender's economic
advantage and the sender's success prospects.
Valentin L. Krustev, University of Alabama
valentin.krustev@ua.edu
Paper Deterrence and Provocation in the Acquisition of Nuclear
Weapons
When it comes to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, we still
are not sure what mix of tactics might produce which results.
An analysis of certain cases will offer some insights as to which
policies discourage steps towards weapons acquisition.
J. David Singer, University of Michigan
jdsinger@umich.edu
Paper State Weapons Programs, Strategic Ambiguity, and Diplomatic
Engagement
We provide a game-theoretic model which suggests that nonrogue
states attain their arms-control objectives at least cost by
diplomatically engaging rogue states and permitting ambiguity over
whether rogue states actually possess weapons.
Brett Benson, Vanderbilt University
brett.v.benson@vanderbilt.edu
Franklin Wilson, Vanderbilt University
franklin.e.wilson@vanderbilt.edu
Disc. Mark Souva, Florida State University
msouva@fsu.edu
19-5 PRINCIPAL-AGENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION (Co-sponsored with International
Political Economy, see 14-32)
Room UEH 409 on the 4th Floor, Thur at 4:45 pm
Chair Xinyuan Dai, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
xdai@uiuc.edu
Paper Agent Selection in International Delegation: The Delegation of
Regulatory Authority in the SPS-Agreement of the WTO
I analyze agent selection in a case of international delegation that
recently gained prominence when several WTO disputes were
decided against powerful member states for violating the Agreement
in their national health and (food) safety regulations.
Tim Buthe, Duke University
buthe@duke.edu
Paper The Importance of Insulation in IGOs
Agents may be insulated not only from states’ institutionalized
influence, but also from their normative influence.
Intergovernmental emanations – which are intergovernmental
organizations, but not necessarily created by governments -
illustrate.
Tana Johnson, Univeristy of Chicago
tana@uchicago.edu
Paper
Paper
Disc.
Principals and Interests: Common Agency and Environmental
Lending at the Multilateral Development Banks
Member states coalescing as collective principals can effectively
delegate to development banks. Ordered-probit analysis of 30,000
loans suggests that, when principals’ environmental preferences
change, loan portfolios follow.
Daniel L. Nielson, Brigham Young University
daniel_nielson@byu.edu
Michael J. Tierney, College of William and Mary
mjtier@wm.edu
The Political Economy of Treaty Ratification: The Case of
Bilateral Investment Treaties
Bilateral investment treaties guarantee legal rights for foreign
investors. We explain the variation in the time passed between the
signing and ratification of BITs by examining the effect of executive
constraints and treaty embeddedness.
Yoram Z. Haftel, University of Illinois, Chicago
yhaftel@uic.edu
Alexander Thompson, Ohio State University
thompson.1191@osu.edu
Xinyuan Dai, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
xdai@uiuc.edu
22-5 RACE, CLASS AND PARTICIPATION
Room UEH 408 on the 4th Floor, Thur at 4:45 pm
Chair Brian DiSarro, University of Iowa
brian-disarro@uiowa.edu
Paper Contextual Income Inequality and Political Participation
I find state-level income inequality is negatively related to voter
participation while county-level income inequality is positively
related. This insight resolves conflicting scholarly findings and has
wider application to other social phenomenon.
Michael P. McDonald, George Mason University
mmcdon@gmu.edu
Paper Social Capital, Race, and Turnout
An empirical investigation of how social capital affacts racial
turnout differences in the U.S. elections.
Baodong Liu, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh
liu@uwosh.edu
Paper The Role of the Classes in the 2004 Presidential Election
This paper examines the role of the different social classes in the
2004 presidential election. This paper tries to answer the question of
whether or not the gap between the lower class and non-lower class
remain the same.
Uisoon Kwon, University of Minnesota, Duluth
ukwon@d.umn.edu
Paper Spillover Effects of Felon Disenfranchisement and Racial
Profiling
Recent work has estimated the effects of felon disenfranchisement
and its political consequences. This study significantly expands the
estimate, drawing from work on social networks. We then examine
additional impacts of racial profiling.
Chris Finn, University of California, Berkeley
cfinn@berkeley.edu
Jack Glaser, University of California, Berkeley
jackglaser@berkeley.edu
Paper Race, Ethnicity, and Turnout in U.S. Presidential Elections
A comprehensive analysis of the new role race plays in determining
turnout. Included in the analysis are racial subgroups and structural
variables to help explain determinants of turnout.
Beth Ginsberg, Baruch College - CUNY
beyla@aol.com
Disc. Sylvia Manzano, Texas A&M University
smanzano@politics.tamu.edu
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