2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Thursday, April 3-8:00 am
Paper
Paper
Disc.
Presidential Rhetoric and Missionary Politics
The paper performs a content analysis on the rhetorical
manifestation of missionary politics in presidents’ public speeches
from George Washington to George W. Bush.
Adrian Ang, University of Missouri, Columbia
auack5@mizzou.edu
Domesitic Policy Discourse in the Inaugural Addresses
Here I examine domestic policy discourse in the Inaugural
Addresses. In particular I examine: (a) rhetorical strategies
Presidents appropriate; (b) the substance of their rhetoric; and (c)
implications of both for American political development.
Michael E. Bailey, Berry College
mbailey@berry.edu
Karen S. Hoffman, Wheeling Jesuit University
khoffman@wju.edu
Brandon Rottinghaus, University of Houston
bjrottinghaus@uh.edu
40-2 PARTIES AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION
Room PDR 17 on the 5th Floor, Thur at 8:00 am
Chair David W. Rohde, Duke University
rohde@duke.edu
Paper Presentation of Partisanship: Representation and Party
Leadership Activity
Examines House members’ choices over (1) participating in the
extended party leadership and (2) presenting and explaining that
leadership activity to the constituency in light of both member and
constituency characteristics.
Scott R. Meinke, Bucknell University
smeinke@bucknell.edu
Paper Parties, Coalitions and the Internal Organization of
Legislatures
This paper presents a general model of legislative organization that
encompasses as special cases the competing theories in the debate
on the strength of political parties (Cox and McCubbins vs. Krehbiel
vs. Aldrich and Rhode).
Daniel Diermeier, Northwestern University
d-diermeier@kellogg.northwestern.edu
Razvan Vlaicu, University of Maryland
vlaicu@econ.umd.edu
Paper Does Size Matter Simulating Representative Committees, 1989
- 2006
Monte Carlo simulation techniques on House committees’
ideological composition from the 101st to 109th Congresses
generate ideal representative ratio results for committees and allow
tests for unrepresentative committees over time.
J. Mark Wrighton, Millikin University
mwrighton@millikin.edu
Geoffrey D. Peterson, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire
petersgd@uwec.edu
Paper Strategic Party Government
This paper presents a theory of Strategic Party Government and
tests key claims of the theory. We claim that legislative parties
advance their members' electoral interests by winning key votes
with minimum voting cohesion.
Gregory Koger, University of Miami
gkoger@miami.edu
Matthew Lebo, Stonybrook University
mlebo@notes.cc.sunysb.edu
Disc. Matias Iaryczower, California Institute of Technology
miaryc@hss.caltech.edu
David W. Rohde, Duke University
rohde@duke.edu
Gisela Sin, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
gsin@uiuc.edu
41-1 PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
Room Suite 15-250 on the 15th Floor, Thur at 8:00 am
Chair Michael L. Mezey, DePaul University
mmezey@depaul.edu
Paper Senators' Response to Constituents' Approval of the President
We investigate whether incorporating state level public opinion data
into a model explains when senators vote with the president on key
issues. We also assess the degree to which the staggered election
cycle in the Senate influences this dynamic.
Caitlin Elizabeth Dwyer, University of Minnesota
Dwyer077@umn.edu
Sarah Ann Treul, University of Minnesota
streul@umn.edu
Paper Presidents and Party Resources in Congressional Elections
This paper examines the influence of the president on the
distribution of party resources in congressional elections.
Comparisons of both parties show that presidential incentives could
lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources for the party.
Aakash M. Dharmadhikari, University of California, San Diego
adharmadhikari@ucsd.edu
Paper
Disc.
Presidential Focus in Midterm Congressional Elections
Are midterm elections presidential referenda by nature or do the
candidates create a referenda through campaign messages This
paper merges campaign context data with NES data to explore the
underlying dynamic of midterm elections.
James D. King, University of Wyoming
jking@uwyo.edu
Michael L. Mezey, DePaul University
mmezey@depaul.edu
42-1 COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Room UEH 401 on the 4th Floor, Thur at 8:00 am
Chair James R. Rogers, Texas A&M University
rogers@politics.tamu.edu
Paper The Uneven Effects of Commitment Institutions
Scholars contend that political rules can resolve contractual
inefficiencies when promises are not credible. This argument fails
to account for the uneven effects of commitment devices across
parties. We propose and test an alternative theory.
Jeffrey K. Staton, Emory University
jeffrey.staton@emory.edu
Christopher Michael Reenock, Florida State University
creenock@fsu.edu
Marius Radean, Florida State University
mradean@fsu.edu
Paper
Paper
Paper
The Determinants of Congressional Attacks on the Court
This paper tests the formal model of congressional-judicial relations
developed in Clark (2007). It shows that court-curbing legislation
serves as a link between the public and judicial elites, and shows
how Congress can mediate between those actors.
Tom S. Clark, Princeton University
tsclark@princeton.edu
Legislative Support for an Independent Judiciary
This paper provides a systematic, large-N test of Whittington's
(2005) claim that current legislative majorities maintain independent
courts because judicial review can overcome the barriers to
legislative action created by previously enacted laws.
Erica Socker, Texas A&M University
sock_11@politics.tamu.edu
Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public
Law
This paper considers the type and quantity of evidence that an
overseer should require before allowing a decision-maker to enact a
policy. The analysis generates predictions regarding how overseers
might choose evidentiary standards.
Matthew Stephenson, Harvard University
mstephen@law.harvard.edu
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