2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Saturday, April 5-8:00 am
Paper
Paper
Disc.
Administrative Directives and the Presidency: Going Beyond
Executive Orders
Using data from the Truman through the Bush (43) administrations,
this paper provides an empirical analysis of the issuance of
multiple administrative directives (executive orders, memoranda,
proclamations, and executive agreements, among others).
Carlos E. Diaz-Rosillo, Harvard University
cdiaz@fas.harvard.edu
Ronald Anguas, Harvard University
anguas@fas.harvard.edu
The Conditions Under Which Presidents Offer Signing
Statements
I investigate the conditions under which presidents are most
likely to offer policy signing statements from 1948 to 2004. I
test competing hypotheses of divided government, presidential
popularity, and types of agencies that presidents target.
Adriano A. Udani, University of Minnesota
udani001@umn.edu
T. Alissa Warters, Francis Marion University
twarters@fmarion.edu
R. Steven Daniels, California State University, Bakersfield
rdaniels@csub.edu
40-12 POLARIZATION OF LEGISLATURES I
Room PDR 17 on the 5th Floor, Sat at 8:00 am
Chair Margaret E. Ellis, University of Oklahoma
ellisme@ou.edu
Paper Culture Wars and the Death of Traditional State Legislative
Politics
State legislatures in 1960 looked much like their 19th Century
counterparts. Through redistricting, reform, and reaction to national
initiatives, they changed profoundly by 1974, and in Kansas this
served as a prelude to the Culture Wars.
Burdett A. Loomis, University of Kansas
bloomis@ku.edu
Dennis Chanay, University of Kansas
chanay@ku.edu
Paper Congress and the Polarity Paradox: Enacting Landmark Laws,
1857-1994
Too much institutional conflict can inhibit landmark productivity
in Congress, but so can too little conflict. Moderate conflict fosters
productivity. The paper tests this thesis for all Congresses from
1857 to 1994.
Lawrence C. Dodd, University of Florida
ldodd@polisci.ufl.edu
Scot D. Schraufnagel, University of Central Florida
sschrauf@mail.ucf.edu
Paper Polarization and the Rise of Omnibus Appropriations: A Causal
Analysis
This paper tests a causal theory linking increasing partisan
polarization in Congress with the decline of regular order and rise of
the omnibus process in passing federal spending bills.
Peter Christopher Hanson, University of California, Berkeley
phanson@berkeley.edu
Paper Party Polarization in State Legislatures: The Case of the Florida
House
Using a combination of survey data and vote-based measures we
investigate the extent to which the Florida House of Representatives
has recently become more polarized between the parties, and the
factors that would explain any such polarization.
Nicol C. Rae, Florida International University
raen@fiu.edu
Kathryn DePalo, Florida International University
kadepalo@bellsouth.net
Sarah Poggione, Florida International University
poggione@fiu.edu
Paper
Disc.
Explaining Ideological Polarization Within the Senate
Although Congress has become more polarized, most research has
focused on the House. However, explanations for polarization in the
House do not apply to the Senate. This paper provides evidence for
some possible explanations of Senate polarization.
Josh M. Ryan, University of Colorado, Boulder
Joshua.ryan@colorado.edu
Matthew Green, Catholic University of America
greenm@cua.edu
40-22 PARTY POWER: METHODS AND CONSEQUENCES
Room Suite 11-250 on the 11th Floor, Sat at 8:00 am
Chair Gary Bugh, Texas A&M University
gary.bugh@tamut.edu
Paper Party Power and Moral Issues in Congress
Research suggests party influence was negligible in moral and
religious matters prior to 1996. We suggest this scenario has
changed since then, and examine roll call votes from the 105th to
108th Congresses, controlling for a member's preferences.
Lilliana Hall Mason, Stony Brook University
lillianahall@gmail.com
Naser L. Javaid, Stony Brook University
naser.javaid@gmail.com
Paper Partisan Scheduling and Public Policy
This paper studies partisan legislative scheduling. I argue that
electoral pressures induce the majority party leader to concentrate
bills at the end of a Congress, when its policy influence is greatest.
Empirical tests support the hypothesis.
Edward Stiglitz, Stanford University
jeds@stanford.edu
Paper Why Following Cox and McCubbins First Commandment
Bankrupts Party Cartels
Cox and McCubbins (2005) first commandment is “Thou shalt not
aid bills that will split thy party.” However, if followed religiously
it typically leads to the destruction of the partisan majority the
partisan cartel is meant to empower and protect.
Jesse T. Richman, Old Dominion University
jrichman@odu.edu
Paper Explaining Party Influence on Roll Call Voting
This paper explains the fluctuation in party influence on roll calls
in the U.S. House of Representatives. Hypotheses derive from the
conditional party government theory, the ideological balance of
power theory, and divided government.
Jun-deh Wu, University of North Texas
jw0107@unt.edu
Disc. Mónica Pachón, University of California, San Diego
mpachon@ucsd.edu
Craig Goodman, Texas Tech University
craig.goodman@ttu.edu
42-12 WHY LITIGATE
Room UEH 409 on the 4th Floor, Sat at 8:00 am
Chair Stephen L. Wasby, University of Albany
wasb@albany.edu
Paper Peititon and Review: The Choices Litigants and Justices Make
Fusing two theories of Supreme Court oversight--strategic litigant
and auditing hypotheses--this paper seeks to clarify the role of law,
litigants and their impact on the choices justices make during the
certiorari process.
Maxwell H.H. Mak, Stony Brook University
mmak@ic.sunysb.edu
250