2008 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Thursday, April 3-2:45 pm
Disc.
Christian Dean, Dominican University of California
dean@dominican.edu
35-3 PUBLIC GOODS
Room UEH 405 on the 4th Floor, Thur at 2:45 pm
Chair Dimitri Landa, New York University
dimitri.landa@nyu.edu
Paper Legitimacy and Enforcement in an Uncertain World: A Public
Goods Experiment
We explore the dynamics of enforcement and compliance in public
goods experiments when error rates in monitoring are exogenous
and when they result from an investment decision, offering a novel
window onto the "legitimacy" of compliance regimes.
Eric S. Dickson, New York University
eric.dickson@nyu.edu
Sanford C. Gordon, New York University
sanford.gordon@nyu.edu
Gregory A. Huber, Yale University
gregory.huber@yale.edu
Paper Representative Democracy and the Provision of Public Goods:
An Experiment
Subjects played a repeated public goods game under alternative
institutions: voluntary contributions or delegation (to either an
executive or a legislature). Most groups achieved socially efficient
outcomes, but we also observed majority tyranny.
John Hamman, Carnegie Mellon University
jhamman@andrew.cmu.edu
Roberto Weber, Carnegie Mellon University
rweber@andrew.cmu.edu
Jonathan Woon, University of Pittsburgh
woon@pitt.edu
Paper The Effectiveness of Parties in Public Good Provision
In this paper, I use game-theoretic models to assess whether the
institutionalization of legislative exchange by way of parties
improves the prospects for successful public good provision.
Rene Lindstaedt, SUNY, Stony Brook
rene.lindstaedt@stonybrook.edu
Paper A Formal Analysis of Patronage Politics
This essay presents a formal model that tries to advance in the
search of the conditions for the existence of patron-client relations;
it analyses the effects of issues such as income distribution, social
cleavages and ideological preferences.
Leonardo A. Gatica, University of Guadalajara
leonardo.gatica@cucea.udg.mx
Disc. Dimitri Landa, New York University
dimitri.landa@nyu.edu
John Wiggs Patty, Harvard University
jpatty@gov.harvard.edu
36-4 ANALYZING EXPERIMENTS
Room Honore on the Lobby Level, Thur at 2:45 pm
Chair Philip Paolino, University of North Texas
ppaolino@unt.edu
Paper Blocking and Goldilocks: Improving Political Science Field
Experiments
By blocking on covariates before randomization, political scientists
can do significantly better than completely randomized designs. I
describe statistical and political advantages of blocking, introduce
original software, and discuss applications.
Ryan T. Moore, Harvard University
ryantmoore@post.harvard.edu
Paper
Paper
Paper
Paper
Disc.
Strange Bedfellows: Randomized Design with Parametric
Analysis
Two types of randomness are often confused by experimentalists: 1)
randomness assumed by parametric models and 2) randomness from
the process of randomization. One consequence is that regression is
biased for experiments.
Joel A. Middleton, Yale University
joel.middleton@yale.edu
Randomization Tests in Experimental Convenience Samples
We examine the consequences of using classical statistical tests
on experimental data derived from convenience samples and
explain how and why to use alternative tests that do not rely on the
assumption of random sampling.
Luke Keele, Ohio State University
keele.4@polisci.osu.edu
Corrine McConnaughy, Ohio State University
mcconnaughy.3@polisci.osu.edu
Ismail White, Ohio State University/Princeton University
whiteik@polisci.osu.edu
Causal Inference with Mismeasured Treatment: Application to
a Field Experiment on Democratic Deliberations
We study the identification of the average treatment effect when the
binary treatment variable is measured with error. Unlike the prior
studies, we allow for measurement error to depend on outcomes and
derive sharp bounds under various assumptions.
Kosuke Imai, Princeton University
kimai@Princeton.Edu
Teppei Yamamoto, Princeton University
tyamamot@princeton.edu
Incorporating Self Selection into Experimental Designs
I propose that researchers use a combination of random assignment
and self-selection experiments when the phenomena of interest
could be shaped by social interactions.
James H. Kuklinski, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
kuklinski@uiuc.edu
Jasjeet Singh Sekhon, University of California, Berkeley
sekhon@berkeley.edu
38-3 MONEY, MONEY, MONEY
Room PDR 4 on the 3rd Floor, Thur at 2:45 pm
Chair Susan Clark Muntean, University of California, San Diego
susancm@ucsd.edu
Paper Mobilizing Money: Contributions by Individuals to PACs
I present an analysis of contributions by individuals to Political
Action Committees (PACs) for the 1996-2006 election cycles, using
data on for different kinds of PACs aggregated by congressional
district.
Robert C. Lowry, University of Texas, Dallas
robert.lowry@utdallas.edu
Paper A Tale of Two Revolutions: Networks of Campaign Finance in
1994 and 2006
We compare and analyze networks of organized interest financing
during two electoral seasons that have greatly shifted the balance of
power in Washington: the Republican Revolution of 1994 and the
Democratic takeover of Congress in 2006.
Suzanne M. Robbins, George Mason University
srobbin1@gmu.edu
Maksim Tsvetovat, George Mason University
mtsvetov@gmu.edu
Paper The Ideological Component of PAC Contributions
I combine estimates of interest group ideology with those groups'
PAC donation patterns to identify the ideological component of
their giving. I find a high degree of ideological motivation in PACs'
contribution decisions.
Amy Melissa McKay, Georgia State University
amckay@gsu.edu
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