Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

Observation 13. Availability of Electricity at LocationCommandsBoth the Taji National Depot and KMTB averaged only 4-5 hours of electrical serviceper day. The lack of power generation negatively affected many critical IA functions.The Iraqi side of Taji Base relied on over 300 diesel powered generators locatedthroughout the base to produce its total output of electrical power. KMTB also useddiesel generators to provide the total capacity of electrical power for the base. Neitherbase was connected to the national electrical grid. Electrical power generation for bothbases was restricted by the lack of fuel for the generators.Because insufficient quantities of diesel fuel were allocated to operate the dieselgenerators, the installations were unable to produce the required electrical capacity toproperly support the Iraqi Army tenant units on base. The lack of electrical capacityadversely affected 3 rd and 4 th line vehicle maintenance repair, equipment repair andmaintenance facilities, supply warehouses, training facilities, mortuary and healthservices, and Iraqi Army divisional headquarters. Additionally, the loss of electricalpower precluded the uninterrupted use of key information technology resources such ascomputer hardware/software for parts requisition and tracking.Applicable CriteriaDoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security,Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, providesguidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts,mission sets, and lessons learned develop. It establishes DoD policy and assignsresponsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct andsupport stability operations.Availability of Continuous Electrical PowerAt both Taji Base and KMTB, the Location Command commanders complained abouttheir inability to provide sufficient electrical capacity for their tenant units and for theirbase general support requirements. At the time of our visit, we were informed thatelectrical power at each base was available for only 4-5 hours per day. The lack ofelectricity was not limited to these sites. The assessment team heard the constant themethat electrical production was insufficient at various sites supporting the ISF. Theshortfall was evident from the battalion up to the national depot level.The Taji Location Command supported over 31 tenant units that included such elementsas the Iraqi Army Support and Service Institute, the Taji National Maintenance Depot,the Taji National Supply Depot, the tracked maintenance facility, the Taji TrainingCenter, the Engineering Schools, and two Iraqi Army divisions. The KMTB LocationCommand supported a similar assortment of Iraqi Army units and facilities. Both Taji93