Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

MNSTC-I and Iraqi military personnel at Taji NAD were initially uncertain how theywould handle those captured weapons that were eventually found to be unserviceable orof no military value. There was no procedure in place to destroy or demilitarize anycaptured weapons considered to be unserviceable or otherwise inappropriate for militaryuse.MNSTC-I noted that U.S. and Iraqi manpower constraints and competing priorities haddelayed the inventory and inspection of captured weapons at Taji NAD and the KMTBLocation Command.However, with the assistance of five Department of the Army civilian inspectors fromAnniston Army Depot and five soldiers with the Military Occupation Specialty 45B(Small Arms Repairer) from 1 st Sustainment Brigade, MNSTC-I had recently begun theinventory and inspection of Captured Enemy Weapons (CEW) at Taji National Depot.As of the date of our visit, 19,989 CEW had been processed. MNSTC-I planned to shipCEW from the Location Commands, including KMTB, to Taji for processing.MNSTC-I was working closely with the Defense Logistics Agency and MoD to establisha demilitarization capability to support the captured weapons work. Initial plans calledfor training and equipping a demilitarization capability within the Taji NationalMaintenance Depot Small Arms Shop. Captured weapons categorized as authorized andrepairable will be passed to the Small Arms Shop and, once repaired, placed into theClass V (weapons and ammunition) system at Taji NAD.Captured weapons not authorized or repairable or of no military value were to bedestroyed. This ongoing effort was recently documented in MNSTC-I FRAGO 08-028[Captured Enemy Weapons 4 th Line Processing at Taji National Depot], SUBJECT:Inspection, Repair, and Demilitarization of Captured Enemy Weapons (CEW) at TajiNational Depot (TND), 041500C Aug 08. For example, MNSTC-I has identified anexisting engineering company in Baghdad with the capability of destroying unserviceableor otherwise unusable CEW.The relatively slow progress in implementing the MoD captured weapons policy and thelack of any MoI policy could result in less than 100 percent accuracy in accountability ofcaptured enemy weapons by serial number and possible misplacement, loss, or theft ofthe weapons, with an attendant risk to Coalition and ISF personnel. Further, theobjectives of the DoD SA/LW Serialization Program could not be achieved for captured,confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons. In addition, weapons that fallinto enemy hands may not be traceable to the responsible individual(s), if recovered.43