Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

Status of Implementation of Recommendations J.1, J.2, and J.3We determined that the intent of recommendations J.1, J.2 and J.3 had been met. Weclosed all three recommendations.Recommendation K.1We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I assist MoD and MoI and theirsubordinate military and police organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percentaccountability and control of ISF weapons by serial numbers.Management Comments to Recommendation K.1MNF-I concurred, noting that they would continue to direct MNSTC-I to advise andassist MoD and MoI with regard to directing their subordinate organizations to achieveand maintain 100 percent accountability of all weapons by serial number.Status of Implementation of Recommendation K.1Our visits to Taji NAD; BPC; the Taji and KMTB Location Commands; two policecolleges; one police academy; and 3d Battalion, 1 st Brigade, 1 st National Police Divisionindicated that subordinate units in both MoD and MoI were accounting for weapons byserial number and providing adequate security for ammunition. While serial numberaccountability would require continued mentoring vigilance on the part of U.S. trainers,we determined that the intent of the recommendation had been met. We have closed thisrecommendation.Recommendation K.2We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I instruct all Coalition MNSTC-Imilitary transition teams to assist/mentor the appropriate Iraqi personnel in MoD and MoIin development of their own centralized database of weapons serial numbers.Management Comments to Recommendation K.2MNF-I non-concurred with the recommendation as it was initially written because MNF-I believed it implied that MNSTC-I should register all Iraqi weapons in the MNSTC-Iweapons serial number database. MNSTC-I reported that its database only tracksweapons procured through the Iraq Security Forces Fund, procured through the U.S. FMSprogram, and re-issued under the captured enemy weapon program at Taji NAD.Tracking weapons procured by the Government of Iraq directly from non-U.S. sourceswas a Government of Iraq responsibility.MNSTC-I noted that it did not have the manpower to track that subset of weapons, evenif the Government of Iraq were to provide the serial numbers. We modified therecommendation to limit it to the categories of weapons specified by MNSTC-I..Status of Implementation of Recommendation K.2There was no evidence that MoD was planning to develop and maintain a centralizeddatabase of weapons. Although MNSTC-I had given the Iraqis a baseline “point ofdeparture” by providing the serial numbers of 63,583 weapons stored at Taji NAD, as18