Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

Observation 17. Iraqi Army Maintenance ProgramThe plan to de-scope the Coalition-funded national vehicle maintenance contract in May2008, transferring responsibility from a commercial contractor to the IA, appeared to beprecipitous and problematic. The problem was particularly acute at the 3 rd Line, orintermediate level, of vehicle maintenance which was being performed at certain, if notall, Location Commands.The Iraqi Army was not prepared to assume the responsibility for 3 rd Line maintenance inMay 2008 because• There were insufficient numbers of maintenance technicians assigned to the 3 rdLine facilities• The Iraqi Army mechanics who were assigned to the 3 rd Line vehicle repair shopswere inadequately trained or experienced to perform the maintenance proceduresrequired at that level of difficulty for the wide assortment of vehicles in the IAinventory• The Iraqi Army had not established mature processes that effectively linked partsmanagement to vehicle maintenanceUntil the IA maintenance and parts management capability is developed, significantintervention of Coalition vehicle maintenance experts and/or contracted personnel wouldbe necessary to mentor these programs. Otherwise, the operational readiness of IAvehicles could suffer as the number of vehicles awaiting repair or parts becomesunmanageable.Applicable CriteriaDoD Directive 3000.05. DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, “Military Support forStability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28,2005, states it is DoD policy that “Stability operations are a core U.S. military missionthat the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall begiven priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed andintegrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education,exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”Vehicle Maintenance ChallengeBecause of the wide mixture of the MoD’s vehicular fleet, vehicle maintenance has beena significant challenge for the IA, and this challenge has been particularly pronounced atthe 3 rd Line (or intermediate level) of maintenance.The diversity in vehicles evolved because the fleet was assembled variously fromvehicles left over from Saddam’s army, MoD vehicle purchases, and vehicle giftsreceived from donor countries. According to a 2006 vehicle inventory, the IA had 6different types of fuel trucks, at least 4 of which came from different manufacturers; 21107