Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

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ConclusionThe shortage of personnel with the requisite security assistance program training andexperience were factors that limited MNSTC-I SAO responsiveness and effectivenessand impaired the accomplishment of the security assistance mission in Iraq. Short toursof duty, combined with the assignment of personnel who did not have prior securityassistance training and experience, hindered program success.Taken together, these personnel weaknesses did not support effective development of thenecessary SAO program stability, continuity, and expertise. The strategic importance toU.S. interests of implementing the FMS program in Iraq in support of standing-up ISF asrapidly as possible merits providing the SAO office with an adequate number ofpersonnel that have the requisite program training, experience, and length of tours. Thiswould likely improve responsiveness and effectiveness in accomplishing the securityassistance mission.Recommendations, Client Comments, and OurResponseRevised, Deleted, or Renumbered Recommendations. As a result ofour assessment of client comments, we combined Recommendations 6.a. and 6.c. into6.a., deleted 6.c. and 6.d., and consolidated the client’s comments to 6.a. and 6.c. under6.a. In addition, we revised Recommendation 6.b. and redirected it to MNSTC-I.6.a. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination withthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Security CooperationAgency; the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; theAssistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); and the AssistantSecretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, ensure that personnelassigned to security assistance positions designated in the Joint Manning Document forthe Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Security Assistance Office havereceived adequate security assistance training and achieved requisite experience levelsbefore deployment. At a minimum, personnel assigned should attend the residentDefense Institute of Security Assistance Management Overseas course.Client CommentsCommander, USCENTCOM concurred. The Commander, USCENTCOM stated thatsince the development of the MNSTC-I JMD (includes the SAO billets), USCENTCOMhas worked with the Joint Staff and Services to expedite sourcing and filling of the SAObillets. The MNSTC-I SAO billets have been coded, making DISAM training arequirement. In addition, to emphasize this point, in July 2008 USCENTCOM requestedassistance from the Joint Staff to ensure that the Services identified personnel well inadvance so that DISAM training can be scheduled and conducted prior to their arrival inIraq.62
Originally, personnel filling the new SAO JMD positions were on 120-day TDY rotationsuntil the Services could begin sourcing and filling the SAO billets. USCENTCOMreported that position fills have approached steady-state so that personnel from theServices were arriving for 12-month tours and attendance at DISAM had become moreconsistent. It was also noted that personnel with SAO/FMS experience are a very lowdensity skill set that is spread across many specialties in all the Services with nosystematic means to track and manage. The vast majority, perhaps 90 percent or more, ofthe personnel in other USCENTCOM SAO shops lacked prior FMS experience.Our ResponseCommander, USCENTCOM, comments were responsive, and no additional commentsare required.6.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, take the necessary action to revise its Joint Manning Document to establish aminimum of 1-year tour lengths for security assistance personnel assigned to the SecurityAssistance Office in Iraq or establish an alternate rotation policy (discussed in thisobservation) similar to that developed by the United States Army Security AssistanceCommand for Army security assistance personnel.Client CommentsThe original recommendation was directed to the Director of DSCA. The AssistantSecretary of Defense, Global Security Affairs (ASD(GSA)), responding for the Director,DSCA, concurred with comment. The Assistant Secretary stated that the operationalcommander must have the personnel and resources necessary to perform the securityassistance mission in Iraq. The Assistant Secretary reported that the Director, DSCA,would continue to work with the Joint Staff and other appropriate organizations who settour lengths and establish training requirements for personnel assigned to MNSTC-I. TheAssistant Secretary stated, however, that the Director, DSCA, did not have the authorityto establish tour lengths for SAOs.Our ResponseThe Assistant Secretary’s comments were responsive. We agree that the length of toursfor SAO personnel in Iraq is a matter for the commander, in this case, MNSTC-I. As aresult, we revised Recommendation 6.b., redirecting it to MNSTC-I. We request thatCommander, MNSTC-I provide comments in response to the final report.63
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INSPECTOR GENERALDEPARTMENT OF DEFE
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Report No. SPO-2009-002 (Project No
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Report No. SPO-2009-002 (Project No
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Table of ContentsExecutive SummaryR
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IntroductionBackgroundThe DoD Offic
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Appendix A discusses the scope and
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letter to clarify that DoD Instruct
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USCENTCOM guidance for its area of
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1. Describe the mission, roles, and
Page 26 and 27: Status of Implementation of Recomme
Page 28 and 29: Management Comments to Recommendati
Page 30 and 31: . Performing a 10 percent sample in
Page 34 and 35: 94 personnel). The proposed JMD als
Page 40 and 41: MiTTs. Between February 15 and Marc
Page 43 and 44: Part II - Arms, Ammunition, and Exp
Page 45 and 46: Observation 1. Assistance to the Mi
Page 47 and 48: 5, March 25, 2008, 12 addresses DoD
Page 49 and 50: MNSTC-I personnel made on-the-spot
Page 51 and 52: 1.a. We recommend that the Commande
Page 53 and 54: Observation 2. Assistance to the Mi
Page 55 and 56: and procedures for receipt, process
Page 57 and 58: MNSTC-I and Iraqi military personne
Page 59: captured weapons, or if it permanen
Page 62 and 63: SAO manning has increased approxima
Page 64 and 65: End-Use Monitoring Compliance PlanT
Page 67 and 68: Observation 4. Accountability of Ni
Page 69 and 70: • Corrective actions implemented
Page 71 and 72: Observation 5. Multi-National Secur
Page 73 and 74: Observation 6. Multi-National Secur
Page 75: elationships with ISF personnel. In
Page 80 and 81: FMS shipments to Iraq will sharply
Page 82 and 83: Client CommentsThe Assistant Secret
Page 84 and 85: Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Army
Page 86 and 87: uild 3 rd and 4 th Line maintenance
Page 89 and 90: Observation 8. Use of Iraq Security
Page 91 and 92: The Iraqi Government has progressiv
Page 93 and 94: Observation 9. Request for Forces f
Page 95: The IG team concurs with MNSTC-I’
Page 98 and 99: Taji Location CommandDuring our vis
Page 100 and 101: • Ministry of Defense Administrat
Page 102 and 103: Recommendations, Client Comments, a
Page 104 and 105: The MoD provided an increased alloc
Page 106 and 107: Recommendations, Client Comments, a
Page 108 and 109: and KMTB used diesel generators exc
Page 111 and 112: Observation 14. Location Commander
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Page 119 and 120: Observation 16. Undistributed ISFF-
Page 121 and 122: Observation 17. Iraqi Army Maintena
Page 123 and 124: een occurring at the school. The te
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17.e. We recommend that Commander,
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extended through May 2008. At that
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investigate the practicality and lo
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developing the IAMP IT network to p
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Part V - Medical SustainabilityIntr
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Observation 19. Iraqi Army Heath Ca
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MNC—I had not fully identified th
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civilian patients. U.S. military me
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those deficiencies are many, but th
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two medical personnel who were alre
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Our ResponseCommander, MNSTC-I comm
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Observation 20. Multi-National Forc
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While some Iraqi Army mentoring and
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eporting. A Medical Operational Rea
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Client CommentsCommander, MNF-I con
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numbers of billets on the MNF-I JMD
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MNF-I as U.S. forces are right-size
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The Military Health System Strategi
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This approach allowed the identific
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objective will also impact Iraqi ca
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21.a.(2) We recommend that the Comm
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at Recommendation 20.c. on page 146
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Client Comments.This is a new recom
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FDA Shelf Life of Medical DevicesFo
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Client CommentsCommander, MNSTC-I c
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guidance on stability operations th
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standardized procedures to ASD(HA)
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The Arms and Ammunition Assessment
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Appendix B. Summary of Prior Covera
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Appendix C. GlossaryThis appendix p
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Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund -
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Small Arms are broadly categorized
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• Officials assigned to the U.S.
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Appendix E. Status of Recommendatio
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RecommendationNumberG-3-aG-3-bRecom
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RecommendationNumberL-2-aL-2-bFOLLO
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Appendix F. Organizations Supportin
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Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afgh
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DoD 5100.76-M. DoD 5100.76-M, “Ph
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DoD 5105.38-M states that:…[T]itl
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USD (AT&L) Value Stream Analysis, A
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leader in health education, trainin
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Appendix H. Notional Division and B
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6. Medical Logistics Status (Author
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Combatant CommandsCommander, U.S. C
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Final ReportReferenceDraftRecommend
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Final ReportReferenceIncorporated a
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Final ReportReferenceRecommendation
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Commander, Multi-National Force-Ira
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Final ReportReferenceClick to add J
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Final ReportReferenceRecommendation
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Final ReportReferenceDraftRecommend
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Commander, Multi-National SecurityT
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Final ReportReferenceRenumbered toR
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Team MembersUnder the guidance of t
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