Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

• Delivery of all parts from Taji Central Warehouse to all other Location Command3rd Line shopsAt the end of November 2008, the de-scoped contract was planned to end with the IraqiArmy assuming full responsibility for all 3 rd Line vehicle maintenance and Class IXMateriel Management.Materiel Management ChallengesThe transition of materiel management to Iraqi control and management was not withoutpotential impediments. Chief among these were:• The sheer number of parts required to support a diverse and non-standardinventory of major equipment such as that existing in the Iraqi Army• A deficiency of Iraqi Army logistics personnel appropriately trained in materielmanagement• Immature and unconnected (non-networked) information technology systemssupporting parts managementDiverse Parts InventoryOne of the most difficult problems with providing parts support for vehicle maintenancein the Iraqi Army was the fact that the IA has over 160 different types of vehicles in itsinventory. The national maintenance contractor – Anham – maintained an AuthorizedStockage List of over 6000 parts for 120 vehicle types. For some vehicles, a mandatoryparts list had not been developed.Obtaining parts for many of the vehicles that had been donated to the Iraqi Army hasbeen a near impossibility. The variation of vehicle type and their dispersion throughoutIraq caused both a lag in the requisition and distribution of parts, as well as a problemmaintaining an adequate supply of frequently used parts for required maintenance. It hadbeen difficult to position repair parts at the correct location. As the Iraqi Army hasgrown, logisticians have had to determine which parts (and how many) should beavailable for 1 st and 2 nd Line maintenance at the organizational level, and which partsshould be held at the Location Commands for 3 rd Line (intermediate or depot level)maintenance.In addition to the quantity and diversity of spare parts required was a coinciding problemof lack of standardized stock numbering. A senior official in the Joint Headquartersopined that there was no concept of standardization for vehicle parts. He further statedthat “most of the vehicles are a liability since they cannot be supported with skilledmaintenance and parts.” It is worth noting that the Coalition in Afghanistan had beenworking to move the Afghan National Army into a system that used NATO stocknumbering.The NATO Codification System represents a uniquely reliable system for creating thestandardized descriptions that are critical in managing a large distributed inventory andan efficient supply chain. The Assessment Team believes that the Coalition should117