Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

IntroductionBackgroundThe DoD Office of Inspector General performed an assessment of the accountability andcontrol of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) 1 provided by the U.S. to the IraqSecurity Forces in September and October 2007. The results of that assessment andrecommendations for corrective actions were published in DoD IG Report No. SPO 2 -2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to theSecurity Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008 (a classified report).At the request of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, the Inspector General assembled an assessment team in February 2008 todetermine the status of the corrective actions recommended for the accountability andcontrol of AA&E in Iraq.The scope of the initial assessment in 2007 was expanded to assess issues involving theaccountability and control of AA&E in Afghanistan, the responsiveness of U.S. ForeignMilitary Sales (FMS) processes supporting the Afghan National Security Forces and theIraq Security Forces (ISF), and the development of logistics sustainment capability forthe Afghan National Security Forces and ISF, to include a related issue on building theAfghan and Iraqi military health care system and their sustainment base.Initiation of the 2007 Iraq AssessmentDoD Office of Inspector General efforts regarding the accountability and control of U.S.-purchased AA&E provided to ISF was triggered by a December 2005 DoD Hotlinecomplaint and other information that a senior U.S. Army officer received illegal gratuitiesfrom a DoD contractor. This had evolved into extensive and ongoing DoD criminalinvestigations involving millions of dollars in bribes and a number of U.S. militaryofficers, noncommissioned officers, civilian officials, and DoD contractors.While investigating these complaints, investigators from the Defense CriminalInvestigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division raised furtherconcerns about the accountability, control, and loss of weapons provided to ISF by theU.S. Government. These concerns were reinforced by a Special Inspector General forIraq Reconstruction audit report, followed by a Government Accountability Office auditreport, which indicated accountability and control problems with particular weaponsprovided to ISF in Iraq.In December 2006 and January 2007, the DoD Office of Inspector General receivedallegations from the Turkish National Police and the Turkish Ministry of Defense that1 We did not include an evaluation of explosives in our assessment.2 DoD IG, Office of Special Plans and Operations.1