Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

For example, 22 percent of the seats were filled at Basic Medic courses between October2007 and March 2008. No classes had been scheduled in the first 3 months of 2008 forMedic Refresher, Preventive Medicine, Enlisted Medical Logistics, Flight Surgeon,Enlisted Flight Medic, or Train the Trainer. No seats were filled in the planned 40-student Medical Logistics Officer class offered between October 2007 and March 2008.Newly accessed medical personnel were often redirected to combat positions beforeattending basic medical training courses.U.S. Military Medical Education and TrainingU.S. military medical personnel providing Coalition medical care throughout Iraq hadrecognized an unmet need for training of Iraqi military and civilian medical personnel.U.S. 62nd Medical Brigade personnel developed over 25 courses in trauma management,preventive medicine, medical logistics, dental care, and many others, and trained 356Iraqi military and civilian personnel in over 3,589 days of training in the first 8 months ofthat initiative – August 2007 through March 2008.While that training was recognized to still fall short of what was required to buildsustainable capability in the Iraqi health care system, it took advantage of nichecapabilities available in U.S. medical treatment facilities, strengthened the relationshipsbetween Iraqi and U.S. medical personnel, and laid foundations for future education andtraining initiatives. However, to achieve a sustainable health care delivery system, theIraqi Army must develop and operate its own training facilities to meet its medicalpersonnel needs.Medical Logistics and FundingA poorly functioning national medical logistics system prevented effective medicalfacility re-supply with consumable medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. Medicallogistics was marginally functional at the Iraqi Army regional depot (LocationCommand) level, and was unable to adequately re-supply even a local garrison clinic.For example, medical equipment purchased by the U.S. before the clinics weretransitioned to Iraqi control could not be sustained because of the lack of regionalavailability of reagents and test kits.Monthly re-supply orders were only received after a three-month delay and were notcomplete. Medical logistics warehouse personnel had not developed procedures to rotatelimited shelf-life medical supplies or to store sensitive supplies and pharmaceuticals inappropriately temperature-controlled environments. In addition, all four of the forklifts atthe Supply Class VIII (medical materiel) warehouse at Taji National Depot were broken.Further, the Iraqi Army Surgeon General had no operating budget for clinics or fieldhospitals, but was dependent on a tedious, centralized MoD funding process for allrecurring operations and maintenance costs.Dependence on U.S. Medical FacilitiesConsequently, the Iraqi Army received much of their inpatient care from U.S medicalfacilities. Approximately 65 to 70 percent of the inpatient care workload of U.S. militarymedical treatment facilities located in Iraq was provided to Iraqi military, police, and128