Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

een occurring at the school. The team obtained an IASSI document identifyingcompleted and projected courses from school establishment through April 2008. Thespreadsheet indicated that 1213 soldiers had completed the Maintenance Supervisorcourse, 335 had completed the Maintenance Level I Organizational MaintenanceCourse, 26 and 257 soldiers had completed the HMMWV Maintenance course. There hadbeen zero graduates from the Level 2/3 Intermediate Maintenance course. Indeed, itappeared that the course, although listed as a potential offering, had never beenscheduled.3 rd Line MaintenanceIn our visits to both the Taji and Kirkush Military Training Base Location Commands wediscovered endemic problems as well. At KMTB, the director of maintenance informedthe team that his company had 50 mechanics of 138 authorized. None of the unit’smechanics were school trained (only trained through on-the-job training), and yet heclaimed that they were all “expert” 3 rd Line mechanics. This commander further statedthat he did not need to send his mechanics to school as they were capable of performingany maintenance needed with their current level of expertise. Coalition MilitaryTransition Team members opined that, contrary to the commander’s view, the mechanicswere barely capable of performing routine, 1 st Line maintenance, and that the on-the-jobtraining program was not that successful. At Taji, we were informed that the 3 rd Linemechanics were likewise significantly understaffed and not well trained. Many of thetechnicians could not read or write. Vehicle maintenance at the intermediate levelrequired the extensive use of diagnostics tools, but diagnostic equipment was lacking.The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for the Iraqi Joint Headquarters also posited thatthe Logistics Commands were not properly staffed in their repair shops and that he wasvery concerned about the lack of capability for vehicle maintenance, not only at theintermediate and depot level, but also at the organizational level.Iraqi Army Maintenance ProgramAs long as the Coalition funded the national maintenance contract for repair of IAvehicles, the MoD had not shown much inclination toward assuming the responsibilityfor that function or the associated requirement for materiel management and distribution.Several Coalition officials opined that as long as the Coalition was doing the job, theIraqi MoD would be reluctant to take over the responsibility (or the associated cost).Nonetheless, in 2008, the Iraqi MoD logistics leadership and MNSTC-I did reachagreement on the priorities for transitioning logistics functions from Coalition to Iraqicontrol. These priorityfunctions were:• Life Support (transitioned to Iraqi control in 2006)• Maintenance and Repair Parts Management26 The Maintenance Level I Organizational Maintenance course is no longer offered at IASSI, instead beingprovided at the Iraqi Army Regional Training Centers (Taji, Kirkuk, Kirkush, An Numaniyah, Tallil, andHabbaniyah).109