Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

Security Assistance Training and ExperienceThe MNSTC-I SAO was generally staffed with personnel who did not possess therequisite security assistance program training and experience necessary to accomplish itsimportant strategic role of providing FMS support for training and equipping ISF.Specifically, only 13 of the 39 personnel assigned to the MNSTC-I SAO arrived incountrypossessing in-residence DISAM security assistance training while only 5 arrivedin-country with prior security assistance experience.DoDD 2055.3, paragraph 4.3.3.2.3 states, “SAO and DAO personnel assigned securityassistance program management functions shall attend the Security AssistanceManagement Overseas course at DISAM. Attendance at the DISAM course ismandatory, unless the course has been completed satisfactorily within the last 5 years.”However, according to documents furnished by MNSTC-I, 26 of 39 SAO personnel hadnot received in-residence DISAM training before being assigned to MNSTC-I.Of the 26 personnel that had not received in-residence DISAM training before beingassigned to MNSTC-I, 14 (one individual assigned to MNSTC-I had received both inresidenceDISAM and in-country security assistance training) received securityassistance training in Iraq while assigned to MNSTC-I, but this reduced effective missiontime. While finding experienced security assistance personnel may be difficult, predeploymenttraining at the DISAM course is achievable, necessary, and required by DoD.In addition, effective program management dictates that the security assistance missionbe accomplished according to the prescribed laws, regulations, and procedures found inCongressional, Department of State, and DoD legal and policy guidelines. The lack oftrained and experienced personnel necessary to perform the many legal, policy, andprocedural tasks required only further hampers the accomplishment of the securityassistance mission.Rotation PoliciesThere were a significant number of personnel assigned to the MNSTC-I SAO with toursof duty of less than 12 months, which further hampered the ability of the command toensure it had sufficiently experienced personnel for quality execution of its securityassistance program.Short personnel tours of duty and different rotation policies among the military serviceshinder MNSTC-I SAO program execution and do not provide adequate stability orcontinuity for the security assistance program in Iraq. The MNSTC-I SAO requirespersonnel with length of tours sufficient to build the institutional knowledge andexperience needed to become effective FMS case managers and to develop effectiverelationships with ISF personnel.At the time of the assessment team’s visit in April - May 2008, 19 of 39 personnelassigned to the SAO were on tours of duty of less than 12 months. Thus, many SAOpersonnel with only 6-month assignments were scheduled to rotate home just when theywere becoming effective in their positions and had begun to establish effective working60