Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists
Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists
Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists
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Observation 2. <strong>Assistance</strong> to the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Defense<strong>and</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Interior in Accounting for <strong>and</strong> Managingthe Inventory <strong>of</strong> Captured <strong>and</strong> Otherwise Obtained13 14WeaponsThe MoD captured weapons policy at Iraqi Army depots <strong>and</strong> Location Comm<strong>and</strong>s hadnot been fully implemented. Thous<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> captured weapons were in storage at TajiNAD <strong>and</strong> the KMTB Location Comm<strong>and</strong>. These weapons had not had their serialnumbers recorded <strong>and</strong> had not been inspected for serviceability <strong>and</strong> placement into theIraqi military weapons inventory.Further, there was no MoD procedure in place to destroy or demilitarize any captured,confiscated, ab<strong>and</strong>oned, recovered, <strong>and</strong> turned-in weapons found to be unserviceable orotherwise inappropriate for military use. Likewise, the MoI did not have a policy forcaptured, confiscated, ab<strong>and</strong>oned, recovered, <strong>and</strong> turned-in weapons.This occurred because U.S. <strong>and</strong> Iraqi manpower constraints <strong>and</strong> competing priorities haddelayed the inventory <strong>and</strong> inspection <strong>of</strong> captured weapons at MoD Location Comm<strong>and</strong>s.Further, the MoI had not yet institutionalized a policy for captured weapons.As a result, this could result in less than 100 percent accuracy in accountability <strong>of</strong>captured enemy weapons by serial number <strong>and</strong> possible misplacement, loss, or theft <strong>of</strong>weapons. Further, the objectives <strong>of</strong> the DoD SA/LW Serialization Program could not beachieved for captured, confiscated, ab<strong>and</strong>oned, recovered, <strong>and</strong> turned-in weapons. Inaddition, weapons that fall into enemy h<strong>and</strong>s may not be traceable to the responsibleindividual(s) if recovered.Applicable CriteriaAlthough captured weapons accountability <strong>and</strong> control at Taji NAD <strong>and</strong> KMTB LocationComm<strong>and</strong> are Iraqi responsibilities, MNSTC-I advisors <strong>and</strong> trainers were involved in theprocess. As such, certain U.S. policies <strong>and</strong> procedures, adjusted to meet Iraqi needs <strong>and</strong>desires, may serve as a basis for the MNSTC-I efforts in these areas.U.S. Government <strong>and</strong> DoD policies <strong>and</strong> procedures that apply to the accountability,control, <strong>and</strong> physical security <strong>of</strong> property <strong>and</strong> AA&E are outlined below.13 Otherwise obtained weapons include confiscated, ab<strong>and</strong>oned, recovered, <strong>and</strong> turned-in weapons inaddition to captured weapons.14 We discussed captured weapons in Observations C <strong>and</strong> F. in DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001,“Assessment <strong>of</strong> the Accountability <strong>of</strong> Arms <strong>and</strong> Ammunition Provided to the <strong>Security</strong> Forces <strong>of</strong> Iraq,” July3, 2008.39