Security Assistance; and Logistics - Federation of American Scientists

econstruction activities between the rural, provincial, and central levels. Specifically,there was minimal communication between the central MoH and provincial healthDirectors General on health care needs and priorities and no apparent Iraqi central-localgovernment coordination or prioritization of projects.Uncoordinated mentoring of MoD and MoH health officials by DoD elements and U.S.Mission-Iraq officials at the rural, provincial, and central levels led to unfocusedexpenditure of resources. However, coordinated mentoring efforts could provide Iraqileadership and management development training at multiple levels, increaseresponsiveness of Iraqi central government leaders to local concerns, and leverage U.S.efforts and resources.U.S. Government and Government of Iraq Coordination and PlanningRecognizing the crucial need for effective coordination between DoD and the U.S.Mission-Iraq with respect to mentoring MoD and MoH, the MNF-I Command Surgeonhad reinstituted an interagency civil-military forum to synchronize strategic health sectorsupport issues and activities that included a process to evaluate and coordinate healthactivities at the rural, provincial, and central levels.While this group was just getting underway after a prolonged period of inactivity, it hadthe potential to improve all U.S. Government health care development activities,particularly those in support of the Iraqi Army. The MNF-I Command Surgeon’s“Strategic Plan for Improving the Iraqi Healthcare System” may serve as a foundation fora coordinated U.S. Government strategy for capacity building in MoD and MoH.We believe that this newly functioning interagency civil-military forum could be thesingle focal point for planning and overseeing the accomplishment of the U.S.Government’s role in supporting the health care goals for MoD and the Iraqi Army, oncethose goals are identified by MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MoD (see Observation 19). Thisforum also needs to plan and coordinate the implementation of U.S. Government healthsector mentoring of MoH with respect to accomplishing support activities on behalf ofMoD and the Iraqi Army.ConclusionAs stated previously in Observation 19, the Iraqi Army health care delivery system wasunable to support combat operations and was dependent on the U.S. and Coalition forcesfor battlefield combat casualty care, casualty evacuation, and some definitive treatment.Moreover, on its own initiative, MoD was unable to develop an independently sustainableIraqi Army health care delivery system.As such, the limited resources and human capital in the Government of Iraq requiremilitary and civilian health care systems in support of the Iraqi Army to be developed asefficiently, economically, and cooperatively as possible. The ability to establish apartnership between the Iraqi military and civilian sectors for hospital care, familymember health care needs, and for specialty care is indeed essential to creating asustainable Iraqi health care system in support of the Iraqi Army. Achieving this153